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INCLUDING

The Planning Commission in India: A Case for Reorganization
by Arvind K. Sharma

Provincial and Local Government in Zambia
by William Tordoff

Rural Development—Report of a Working Group

BOOK REVIEWS
by Professor B. Keith Lucas, R. S. McDougall, Dr. Hans Singer, Dr. Tom Soper, Dr. D. S. Thornton, A. R. G. Prosser and Edwin Ardener

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Editor's Notes

THE relationship between politician and planner, politician and administrator, administrator and his professional and technical colleagues will doubtless provide material for an everlasting dialogue. Whether these relationships are soundly based and working smoothly are, of course, vital to the success of development programmes in many countries.

In this Number Mr. Sharma argues that ministerial membership of the Indian Planning Commission inhibits its proper functioning as an independent neutral planning body, all the more so since States have elected governments with political affiliations no longer supporting those at the centre. As Professor Hanson points out in his commentary what needs to be sought is not an "ideal" system but that which is likely to work best in the given circumstances; and those pertaining in India today may perhaps necessitate the exclusion of politicians from the Commission.

Dr. Seshadri examines rural local government in Andhra Pradesh and deplores the lack of socio-economic progress. He puts blame on the democrats of the Panchayati Raj system for their feuding, on generalist administrators for clinging to superior status when they lack the expertise now needed to make rural development effective. He blames the State Government for failing to reform the administrative structure. He does not, however, conclude as one might have hoped, with his own suggestions for improving the depressing picture that he paints. Some guidelines may well be found, however, in the Report on Rural Development which we are very glad to reproduce. The group of experts who consulted together make a series of carefully considered proposals on which aid for rural development can best be based, covering surveys and feasibility studies, administration and education. Prerequisites to effective aid in this field, as is pointed out, are the wholehearted adoption of schemes by the Governments concerned, active support and understanding from those affected by the plans and effective administration by local people.

Dr. Tordoff follows his two previous articles on Zambia, with a review of the later administrative reforms introduced by President Kaunda in November 1968 – their main purpose being "to make the rural economy a dynamic force in the development of the country". The steps taken have been radical and have created a number of problems; with goodwill and mutual cooperation between political leaders and senior civil servants, Dr. Tordoff believes the problems are not insuperable.

Finally Mr. Kiapi assesses the value of consultative and advisory bodies in East Africa, particularly in relation to the consideration of new legislation. He believes that such bodies can play an important part in the democratic process and provide a useful means of checking or at least of delaying arbitrary action by the executive of government.

* * *

The next Cambridge Conference on development will be held at Jesus College, 13-24 September, 1970. The subject for debate will be "Prospects for Employment in the 1970s." Dr. R. E. Robinson will take the chair.

The Planning Commission in India: A Case for Reorganization*

By ARVIND K. SHARMA

Mr. Sharma is a lecturer in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

THE Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC)[1] in its Interim Report on "The Machinery for Planning" has proposed that the Planning Commission be made a wholly technocratic body by completely eliminating its minister-members including the Prime Minister who has been its chairman ever since its inception.[2] The government, on its part, has not accepted the recommendation *in toto* and has considered it desirable to continue with an arrangement under which the Prime Minister will be its chairman and the Finance Minister one of its members.[3]

As originally conceived by the Advisory Planning Board, appointed by the Interim Government, which submitted its Report in December, 1946, the Planning Commission was intended to be a compact and non-political advisory body.[4] This recommendation could not be implemented on account of the far-reaching political changes that followed in the wake of independence. The efforts of the Board, however, were not all wasted, because the Resolution of the Government of India establishing the Planning Commission, did at least in part, draw inspiration from the Board's recommendation. To begin with the Commission had five full-time non-minister members with the Prime Minister as its Chairman. By 1956,[5] however, a strong ministerial element was injected into the Commission when its non-minister members were counter-balanced by the Prime Minister and other minister-members;

* This article is a considerably revised and shortened version of an article appearing in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, No. 4 of 1968 and is published with the agreement of the Director General of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences.

[1] The ARC was appointed by the Government of India in January, 1966 to go into the various problems of administration at the Central, State and District levels and to make recommendations for streamlining it. One of its terms of reference was "The Machinery for Planning."

[2] *Interim Report of the ARC on "The Machinery for Planning"*, Government of India Press, New Delhi, April, 1967, pp. 9–14. (Cited henceforth as the ARC Report). This Report was mainly devoted to the issue of the Reorganization of the Planning Commission. The Final Report which was submitted to the Government in March, 1968, focused its attention on matters other than reorganization.

[3] Prior to the ARC Report the Commission had seven minister-members (including the Prime Minister as its Chairman) as against five full-time non-ministerial experts.

[4] Mr. Nehru, as Vice-President of the Interim Government, had appointed an Advisory Planning Board with a view to reviewing the work already done in the field of planning and making recommendations regarding priorities and objectives of planning and suitable planning machinery.

[5] For a brief historical survey of the growth of the Commission refer to H. K. Paranjape, *The Planning Commission – A Descriptive Account*, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 5–12.

and this tended to compromise its advisory role.[6] This marked the genesis of the controversy over the status, role and functions of the Commission which right up to this day remains unsettled.

The difficulty that arises on account of the ministerial membership of the Planning Commission is that its decisions tend to be heavily dominated by political considerations to the neglect of paramount techno-economic considerations.[7] The solution would be to go in for a purely technocratic body of experts (referred to henceforth as the Pure Model) as the ARC has recommended. Alternatively one can envisage a Commission of experts and politicians (referred to hereafter as the Mixed Model) under which some such safeguards are provided as would prevent politicians from overstepping their limits so as to give due weight to expert advice. It is clearly the difficulty of maintaining this crucial balance in practice, as has been shown by the Indian experience, that has prompted the ARC to recommend a purely technocratic body of experts.

II

An attempt is being made in this paper to examine the issue of the reorganization of the Planning Commission in the specific context of the recommendations of the ARC on the one hand, and in the general context of the problems relating to the structure and working of an advisory body on the other. This will be followed by a general discussion of the relative merits of the Pure and Mixed models.

The ARC, in recommending a Commission of experts only,[8] has the

[6] This contention receives support from several sources. *See*: (i) The Estimates Committee: ". . . there seemed to be a generally prevalent feeling that the Planning Commission was not just an advisory body, but that it was an additional authority to be reckoned with, which though not part of the ordinary machinery of the Government of India decided every programme of work and whose decisions were to be carried out by all." "21*st Report of the Estimates Committee of Second Lok Sabha on 'The Planning Commission*,' 1957–1958, p. 4. (ii) Dr. D. R. Gadgil (the present Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission): "The root of the failure lies in the process by which the Planning Commission, essentially only an advisory body, has come to mix itself with the actual process of formulation of public policies . . ." D. R. Gadgil, *Planning and Economic Policy in India*, Asia Publishing House, 1961, p. 107. Again, "The activities of the Planning Commission . . . appear indistinguishable from those of the ministries and of the Cabinet." (p. 104). Dr. Gadgil also refers to the Report of the Foodgrains Enquiry Committee which drew attention to the part played by the Commission in an important policy decision in 1955, related to the decontrol of foodgrains. (See pp. 105–106). Further Dr. Gadgil writes, ". . . it is well known that the progress of rural co-operation on accepted lines has, for a considerable time, been blocked by the interference of the Planning Commission with the legitimate sphere of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture." (p. 108). (iii) Asok Chanda: "The Commission presided over by the Prime Minister and with the more important Cabinet Ministers as members started deliberating and taking decisions on all questions . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 273. He cites inter alia an instance where the Commission prevailed over a state government in a matter of policy (pp. 284–285).

[7] This is an inherent weakness of the Mixed Model and root cause of the controversy. For support to this argument see: (1) Dr. D. R. Gadgil: "However, if in one and the same authority both aspects (advice and decision) of the process are inextricably mixed, one or the other must suffer. Inevitably, it is the objective approach that suffers." *op. cit.*, p. 101; (2) Asok Chanda: "When politics and planning become inextricably mixed up, it is planning that suffers in consequence." *op. cit.*, p. 272; and (3) The ARC Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.

[8] While the ARC has recommended the complete elimination of the ministerial element from the Commission, the Study Team of the ARC has recommended the retention of the Prime Minister as its Chairman (See ARC Study Team's *Interim Report on "The Machinery for Planning"*) Government of India Press, New Delhi, March, 1967, pp. 17–34.

intention to keep the politicians away from the decisions at the plan formulation stage which should naturally have a proper techno-economic bias. The reasons which prompted the government to turn down the recommendation and retain the Prime Minister and Finance Minister in the Commission require examination. The following reasons were advanced: (i) that in the absence of ministers the experts' approach would lack socio-political realism; (ii) that with the inclusion of the Prime Minister and important Cabinet Ministers in the Commission its decisions would carry greater prestige and weight; and (iii) that the Prime Minister, would serve as a link between the Commission and the Central Government on the one hand, and the National Development Council (NDC) on the other.

The first argument reserving to politicians the right of imparting socio-political realism to policies and considering experts to be incapable of doing so, has been carried rather too far. In practice the distinction between expert and politician is never so sharp and clear-cut. One could not pretend that the former had no human touch and the latter had no scientific precision. In our opinion, therefore, giving socio-political realism to policies is not the concern of politicians alone, nor is it their monopoly.[9] One is rather inclined to say that at times, in a democracy, the approach of politicians tends to be "sectional".

The second argument that the association of the Prime Minister and top cabinet ministers vests the Commission with prestige is at once outdated and rather too far fetched because in the last analysis, obviously, it is not the association of top politicians but the results that it shows that are going to raise the Commission's prestige. And if at present it is at a very low ebb, it is precisely because its performance record has been none too happy. While the formal association of the Prime Minister as the Chairman of the Commission may have served a useful purpose in its formative stages, the continued existence of such an arrangement to-day is open to question.[10] Indeed we should ask whether it has not led the Commission to extend its activities to "many irrelevant fields to the utter neglect of its main role".[11] One must further ask whether an overlap of this type will not erode executive responsibility to the legislature, and whether the Commission may not lay itself open to the criticism of favouritism and nepotism and thus find its image tarnished. Again, there is a real disadvantage in a system under which the Prime Minister and some of the most powerful cabinet ministers actually participate in the process of plan formulation, thereby committing the Commission to the stand they take with regard to executive matters and the Commission's capacity for an objective evaluation of plan implementation is also marred.[12]

The prestige of the Commission will depend on the value which the ruling party attaches to planning. Once this has been assured during its formulative stage, thereafter, in our opinion political members become a superfluous element on the Commission.

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[9] Professor A. H. Hanson in another context lends support to our contention. See A. H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning – A Study of India's Five Year Plans:* 1950–1964, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 73.

[10] This receives support from Estimates Committee Report, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[11] See Dr. Gadgil, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[12] See ARC Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10, 12.

The third argument that the Prime Minister provides the necessary link between the Planning Commission and the central ministries on the one hand, and between the Commission and the NDC on the other, overlooks more serious disadvantages that occur on this account and also other and perhaps alternatives that are available. The argument assumes that the association of ministers in the past has always made communication with the government easier, whereas the fact is that "while the Ministers represented have vigorously pressed upon the Commission the case of their own Ministries, precisely in doing that they have hampered smooth relations between the Commission and other Ministries which have often felt that their case before the Commission was going by default."[13]

As an alternative one may suggest an informal association of ministers with the Planning Commission whereby the former are invited to meetings when a subject of their special interest is discussed, should be further encouraged and strengthened.[14] A second alternative is also available for maintaining the necessary contacts between the Commission and Central Government. This could be through the agency of "Working Groups" – central government ministries are a constituent part of these – through which so much preliminary work relating to plan formulation is done.[15] As far as the link with the NDC is concerned, looking to the trends of Centre-State relations in the post-fourth general election era, it is quite clear that the non-Congress State Governments may not accept any political complexion to plans. This stresses all the more the need to make the Planning Commission a body of experts alone.[16]

Thus on a closer scrutiny the arguments advanced by the government appear to carry little conviction. However, in not accepting the recommendation of the ARC the government has prevented the Commission from assuming the role originally intended for it. The result is that the earlier criticism that the Planning Commission is much more than an advisory body still holds good. The Commission's recommendations when presented to the Cabinet will have the support of the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister so that their acceptance is more or less a foregone conclusion. In other words, the "policy-making potential" once generated into the Commission by their inclusion would naturally tend to make it play a policy-making role in spite of all the professions to the contrary. Thus the intention of having an advisory Planning Commission is compatible only with the Pure Model.

III

There are further objections to the idea of the Pure Model which need examination.

The fear is sometimes expressed that the proposals of a Commission devoid of its political element would lack political support, and it would, therefore, be an ineffective body. At the outset it may be said that in trying

[13] *Economic and Political Weekly*, Editorial, Vol. II, No. 18, May 6, 1967, pp. 823–824.

[14] This also is the suggestion of the Estimates Committee. See Estimates Committee Report, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[15] The suggestion has found support in academic circles.

[16] The newly emerging political situation in the country lends a new urgency to the matter.

to make out a case for a body of experts it is not our intention to dispute the truth that planning in the ultimate analysis is a political process and that it needs political support to be really effective. But in our opinion the amount of political support forthcoming, as was said earlier also, depends in a more direct measure upon the attitude of the government towards planning and not – as many of us like to think – on how much and to what extent the politicians are associated with plans at the formulation stage. Once this is granted, there is no incompatibility between there being an advisory planning body of experts and its being politically effective. One should rather hasten to add that such a body alone would inspire confidence and command the requisite amount of public respect.[17]

Another question which is often raised is where does one draw the line between plan formulation and plan implementation? The suggestion here is that the two are inseparably interlinked, and in fact overlap. While it is true that one cannot draw a line separating the two, the question that must be asked is whether this blending is incompatible with a purely technocratic body? It is only to ensure that there is no unnatural gulf between policy and implementation and that their intermingling character is recognized that the ARC has strongly recommended close and continuous relations between the Commission and the Prime Minister through the following measures: the Prime Minister should be kept informed of all important decisions of the Commission; copies of agenda for its meetings should be sent to him; he may attend its meetings and participate in discussions whenever he chooses to; he may summon meetings of the Planning Commission; he will preside over the meetings of the Commission when he attends them; etc.[18]

Once the political element is eliminated from the Commission other issues that would need to be considered relate to: (a) the functions of the expert planning body, (b) the location of power of political decision-making, and (c) a clear specification of the role of politicians in the process of planning and the forum through which they will operate.

Having received the policy directives from the government as to the rate and pattern of economic growth that they would like to have, the planning body will mainly concern itself with the formulation of the plan design and spelling out clearly its policy implications. No less important is the job of evaluating plan progress at certain intervals and suggesting changes in policy that the changed conditions may necessitate.[19]

With regard to political decisions, the ARC has underlined that after certain proposals have been considered by the Commission, they will then be referred to the Cabinet for its decision.[20]

The role of the politicians under the new set-up will be two-fold and they

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[17] The experience of those countries who have unquestioned faith in the efficacy of planning bears testimony to our statement. Their planning bodies are purely expert and advisory in nature and engage themselves only in the task of preparing diverse plans and spelling out the policy implications of these. Despite this they are politically very potent just because their governments put an unshakeable faith in planning.

[18] The ARC Report, *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

[19] See functions of the Commission as envisaged by the ARC Report, pp. 4–5.

[20] However, the ARC's Study Team has recommended that not the Cabinet, as a whole, but a sub-committee of the Cabinet should take final decisions on the proposals put forward by the Commission. (See ARC Study Team Report, p. 13). The ARC, on its part, has strongly condemned any such move. (See ARC Report, p. 18).

will discharge these functions through the agency of the NDC. First, they will give to planners a broad framework of planning, and consider adjustments in policy that experts in the Commission may, from time to time, recommend; secondly, politicians will make periodical reviews of the progress of the national plan and make such recommendations as they may consider necessary in this light.

IV

Having examined the government's case against the specific recommendations of the ARC and some other objections to the idea of the Pure Model, we would now like to turn to a general discussion of the relative merits of the Pure versus the mixed model.

Among the existing studies Professor A. H. Hanson's *The Process of Planning* champions the Mixed Model. Prof. Hanson has all praise for India's process of planning under which the politicians, through participation in plan formulation, are able to develop a sense of commitment to the plan objectives. To him the cardinal virtue of the Indian system is that it has put "political teeth" into planning.[21] One may not agree wholly with Professor Hanson's analysis of the situation because while he takes due account of the advantages of the system, he ignores with an uncautioned ease its anomalies and its inherent contradictions which have various expressions in the system. Professor Hanson does not seem to appreciate the real nature of the problem involved, viz., under the Mixed Model there is a tendency for an almost exclusive political bias to the decisions of the Commission to the neglect of technical and economic considerations. While he rightly observes that "the problem is how to give the collective views of the experts their means of expression and their proper weight without reducing the Planning Commission to a virtually powerless, "non-political' body,"[22] the solution he offers is open to criticism. He seeks to solve the problem through the device of an "organizational expression" to the distinction between technical work and political decision making.[23] But his suggestion makes the untenable assumption that the processes of technical and political decision-making within the Commission can be put into two separate watertight compartments.

What needs to be realized is that the problem involved here is a much deeper and more delicate one than merely being one of an organizational device or innovation, as Professor Hanson seems to think. The solution he offers would touch only the surface of the problem. This is so because the problem involves a whole host of questions of a complex and psychological nature relating to change in attitudes and to large-scale major adjustments. For instance, how far politicians are ready to listen to the recommendations of technical experts; how far the political leadership of the country is ready to take unpleasant decisions, dictated by techno-economic considerations –

21 A. H. Hanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

23 "This might take the form of having two kinds of Planning Commission meetings. Ordinary meetings, at which the technical work was done, would be attended only by non-ministerial members, together with such officials as they choose to call in for advice. Full sessions, at which the results of the technical work would be assessed and important policy decisions taken, would be attended by all members, ministerial and non-ministerial." *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.

knowing that these permit of no compromise – in pursuance of accepted national policies. It would depend in no less measure on how far the experts successfully maintain their neutrality and develop courage and honesty to stick to their opinions, which they know are right and appropriate, whatever may be the price that may have to be paid. It is further a question of developing conventions and traditions and a code of conduct whereunder politicians and experts in the Commission learn to understand and respect each other's point of view. It also involves what attitude the press takes, how much support it lends to these conventions and customs by bringing to light the cases where these have been disregarded. No less important is the role of public opinion, how it reacts to the whole situation, which in turn would depend upon how mature public opinion in the country is. It may, however, be stated here that these are essentially long term remedies. Thus the Mixed Model would appear to be more of an ideal which, in the present circumstances, is unattainable; and the Pure Model seems better to suit the existing situation.

Finally, it may be pointed out that in the changed context of Centre-State relations[24] after the fourth general election – an expert and advisory planning body, working on the basis of guidelines provided by such a body as the NDC, would appear to be more acceptable to the state governments and likely to inspire more confidence in them. In the coming years, therefore, more independence from the central government will be desirable and necessary for the Commission. The non-congress state governments may not accept any ideological complexion to the plans which a Commission based on the Mixed Model would inevitably have in terms of size, objectives and priorities. A planning body whose independence and neutrality is in doubt, let alone one which contains central Government ministers, may have to be given up.[25]

Thus any scheme of reorganization of the Planning Commission, to be meaningful, must ensure that it is able to work with reasonable independence from the government, and more important that it does not, in spite of this, suffer neglect at the hands of government. In other words, we must make sure that its expert and advisory character does not render it ineffective. Herein lies the crux of the reorganization issue.

We may, therefore, conclude that the needs of the future cannot be met without making a radical departure from the existing arrangements. Particularly on account of the new turn in Centre-State relations and which may even be taken further, the retention of the Mixed Model appears to have become all the more untenable. The Pure Model may have to be adopted as a matter of compulsion, if not by choice.

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[24] For study of impact of planning on centre-state relations refer to: (i) K. Santhanam, *Union-State Relations in India*, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1960, pp. 43–59; (ii) S. A. H. Haqqi, *Union-State Relations in India*, Ed., Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967 pp. 115–130; (iii) D. T. Lakdawala, *Union State Financial Relations*, Lalvani Publishing House, Bombay, pp. 78–117.

[25] See observations of the ARC Report, *Op. cit.*, p. 12. In pursuance of the objective of making Commission strong and independent the idea of giving a constitutional status to it has often been mooted. But this, for want of a consensus among political parties on the need for planning, clearly does not lie in the realm of the possible. And even if, let us for a moment assume, it were possible, it may not serve the desired purpose. The experience of the working of the Union Public Service Commission, which is a constitutional body, is a pointer in this direction.

Commentary

by A. H. HANSON

(Professor of Political Science at the University of Leeds)

I fully agree that a reorganization of the Planning Commission has become inevitable – indeed it is already largely accomplished as a result of the Government's acceptance and implementation of many of the ARC's proposals. In my view, however, this is not because the Commission's original organization was inherently defective, but because, as a result of changes in the political situation, a "strong" Planning Commission, functioning as a kind of quasi-executive emanation of the central Government, is now unworkable. I still believe that in a developing country the effectiveness of planning will partly depend on the prestige and authority enjoyed by the Board, Commission, Ministry or other agency to which the planning job has been entrusted, and that such prestige and authority, other things being equal, will be enhanced by the adoption of what Mr. Sharma terms the "mixed" model – to see why he need only look at the way the "pure" model works, or fails to work, in certain other countries. Nevertheless, like everyone else I have to accept that the *possibility* of using the "mixed" model depends on political circumstances of a kind that no longer exist in India.

Mr. Sharma, of course, recognizes this when he says that "the problem . . . is much deeper and more delicate" than one of mere "organizational device or innovation." But if he thinks that I am of the contrary opinion he cannot have read *The Process of Planning* very carefully. Admittedly, I there made certain suggestions for administrative reorganization which I thought would have improved the Commission's mode of operation; but I was very careful not to present these as any kind of cure-all. Nor, to his credit, does Mr. Sharma think that *his* proposals constitute a panacea. Nevertheless, he cannot be acquitted of a certain rigidity of thought on the subject of organization, since he appears to welcome the political circumstances that are compelling the adoption of the "pure" model, or something very much like it, and to deplore those that, in former days, inhibited its adoption. Surely the question that needs to be asked is not "What is the Ideal Type of the Planning Commission?" but "What kind of Planning Commission is likely to work best in the given circumstances?"

The real point of his article, which tends to get lost in his discussion of Ideal Types, is contained in his last sentence: "The Pure Model may have to be adopted as a matter of compulsion, if not of choice." Although doubtful about the usefulness of his classificatory terminology, I am certainly prepared to support this judgement. Indeed, I have already expressed approximately the same view, at some length, in my article on "Power Shifts and Regional Balances" in the symposium entitled *The Crisis of Indian Planning*, edited by Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton. My original proposals, in *The Process of Planning*, were based on a study of Indian experience which did not go beyond 1964, the year in which I completed my researches for that book. There were many, of course, who disagreed with

me even then – Professor Gadgil, now Deputy Chairman of the Commission, was the most distinguished of them. But I continue to hold that, at the time, I was more right than wrong. The *soi-disant* political scientist, alas, is not much better as a prophet than anyone else, and his books tend to "date" rather more quickly than most.

Rural Development
Report of a Working Group*

Preface

Rural development is a matter of great importance to many less developed countries. Their greatest single natural resource is the land, the majority of their people have to live off its product. Industrialization cannot provide a quick and easy way out of rural poverty. The growing lack of employment outlets as compared with aspirants for jobs in towns in several such countries has struck observers in recent years. But while rural development is necessary if a balanced overall progression of the economy is to be achieved, how best can a country go about things to secure this, and how can overseas aid help with this purpose? For rural development ranges over a wide and complex set of problems, covering agriculture, education, employment and social questions.

Some appreciation of these, in respect of one region – East Africa, was made at a Conference on Education, Employment and Rural Development in Kenya in 1966, attended by the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, the late Sir Andrew Cohen. But these problems exist in many other countries; and it was therefore decided in 1967 to establish in the Ministry of Overseas Development a Working Group on Rural Development "To consider the problems of rural development, with particular reference to unemployed youth, and the contribution which the Ministry of Overseas Development might make in this field".

Introduction

What is rural development? It may be defined as any series of integrated measures having as their purpose the improvement of the productive capacity and standard of life in its broadest sense of those in developing societies who live outside the urban areas, and particularly of those people who depend directly or indirectly on the exploitation of the soil. It will include those engaged in agricultural, forestry, fishery and related production, rural industries and handicrafts, and trade and commerce and services in the rural areas. But whatever the specific measures adopted may be, the economic and social advancement of all sections of the rural community must depend in the final analysis on the success or otherwise of the action taken to improve the productivity of agriculture.

Agriculture and Development

Economic development is a process which requires the growth and modernization of both the rural and urban sectors. Indeed, the rural sector con-

* This Report of a Working Group under the chairmanship of Mr. G. A. Foggon, Overseas Labour Adviser, has been published as a separate booklet by The Ministry of Overseas Development from whose Information Department copies can be obtained, post free, for shs. 1/6.

stitutes the social and economic environment of such a large proportion of the total population in developing countries that, unless it can be set moving, many of the objectives of development will be frustrated. But it has to be accepted that in many, indeed the majority, of developing countries, the rural sector as a whole has lagged behind the rest of the economy, while at the same time the growth of the population has added to its burdens and depressed its standards. The low prices paid by urban people for farm produce, which is usually a matter of Government policy aimed at cheap food for urban workers, has a marked effect on agricultural development. It must be remembered that a healthy agricultural sector can provide the main market for industrial production, whether urban or rurally based. The two sectors are therefore absolutely interdependent. It is becoming increasingly recognized that at the heart of the problem of development in the poorer countries lies the question of how the economy of the towns and the rural sector can grow in harmony.

Behind much of the economic planning of recent years has lain the assumption that, as agriculture develops and becomes more efficient, surplus labour will be made available to the towns to meet the growing needs of industry, commerce, Government services and secondary and tertiary activities. There are few countries where such a situation prevails in practice today. So far from the land being able to send its surplus labour to fill the swelling ranks of industry, it is being called upon more and more to absorb greater numbers of people and to provide them, not only with some measure of employment, but also with the basic necessities of life. In some cases this will be possible but there are some countries where the poor quality of the natural resources in the soil does not permit such a solution. In the actual allocation of resources, this has been too little recognized.

Unemployment – A problem of youth

Behind these hard truths lie not only the frequent failure to devote a fair proportion of resources and effort to the rural sector, but also the daunting imbalance of population with which most countries in the developing world are faced. A situation has now arisen where the developing countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia have approximately twice as many of their young people under 16 years of age as have the countries of Western Europe and North America. *Pro rata*, therefore, the developing countries must find employment and a useful way of life for twice the number of new entrants to the labour force each year as must the industrialized countries, and these new entrants must compete for wage-earning employment in a comparatively small modern wage-earning sector. The statistics are alarming. The net *increase* in the potential working population in the developing world is expected to reach 162 *million* during the decade 1960–70 and 226 *million* in the following decade, as against 50 *million* and 55 *million* respectively in the developed countries of the world. Put in another way, the number of young people entering the labour market is at present at least twice the number of withdrawals, and this ratio will increase to about three to one by about 1980. Evidence of widespread unemployment and underemployment is already accumulating, and this unemployment is particularly affecting young people. In Jamaica recently 39 per cent of the unemployed were found to be

in the 15–19 age group; of the 121,000 in this age group, 43 per cent were out of work, of whom more than half had never held a job. In Guyana, 44 per cent of the urban unemployed were recently recorded as being in the 14–19 age group. In Ceylon, it was estimated in June, 1966, that out of 475,000 unemployed, no fewer than 169,000 were between 14 and 18 years of age, and a further 205,000 from 19 to 25. In Malaysia, the unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group was double that for the labour force as a whole, and in the 15–19 age group unemployment reached levels of more than 30 per cent.[1] That education is no insulation against unemployment is shown by the fact that a higher unemployment rate among the better educated, which has thus far been a characteristic of Asian countries, is beginning to make its appearance in some African countries. It cannot be assumed that these unemployed young people will have a better chance of finding work as they grow older, since each year the unemployed and under-employed labour force will be swollen by fresh waves of young people.

Over-optimism about the scale and pace of industrial development has been one factor in the neglect of the unemployment problem, but experience should be a sharp corrective. In Latin America, for example, between 1950 and 1960, factory employment absorbed only nine per cent of the growth of the labour force and even less thereafter. If it be assumed that a typical developing country, in which some five per cent of the labour force is currently employed in wage-earning employment, succeeds with a very high rate of investment in expanding output in this sector at the rate of 10 per cent a year, employment in the wage-earning sector might rise at the rate of five per cent of the labour force (experience has shown that employment rarely rises more than half as fast as output) which would amount to an annual increase of only one-quarter of one per cent of the total labour force – and a 10 per cent rate of expansion of industry is more than most countries could ever achieve.

In earlier centuries adjustments to population increase were made by Malthusian checks and emigration. The former is no longer morally acceptable; the latter is impracticable in view of the dimensions of the problem. Since industrial development cannot in the short term (and the working population of 1985 is already born) absorb the massive additions to the work force year by year, then unemployment alone must lead to a renewed consideration of the problems of the rural areas where 70 per cent to 90 per cent of the population must continue to live and work. The need for improved food production to feed the rising population adds further weight to the needs of the rural areas. "The case for balanced growth rests ultimately on the need for a balanced diet".

What has been called the "awful arithmetic" of the population explosion has therefore reversed the old order and produced a situation where an objective of development policy must in many countries be the absorption by agriculture and the rural sector of the economy of *more* labour, not less. "It has been the low mutter of unemployment which could grow to such a thunder of discontent which has moved so many African Governments in their newest plans to look again towards rural development as a priority task."[2]

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[1] ILO Geneva, 1967. *Paper MCYW/1967/2.*
[2] Guy Hunter, *The Best of Both Worlds. Oxford University Press*, 1967.

Governments have been understandably reluctant to admit too publicly the difficulties that stand in the way of rapid economic development, but another reason for the slow acceptance in many countries of a policy of agricultural development lies in the unwelcome hint of defeat in any proclamation of a policy of agricultural priority. Indeed, many developing countries see this emphasis as some sort of conspiracy to keep them tied to farms and plantations, leaving industrial production to more advanced countries. There is another difficulty of both political and practical character; the establishment of a modern factory represents an immediate symbol of success and progress, whereas the slow, steady improvement of rural life and agricultural production produces no immediate tangible results which a Government can demonstrate as evidence of the rightness of its policies. It is, moreover, easier to set up a cement factory or some other industrial process, than to marshal the complex administrative arrangements necessary to change the age-long traditions and settled way of life of those who live by subsistence agriculture. Political expediency and practical difficulties contribute to the inherent attractions of investment in industry rather than agricultural development.

The Drift to the Towns

So long as rural areas remain depressed and neglected in the tide of development, deprived of amenities, with unemployment and underemployment endemic and average incomes at a low level, there must continue to be a powerful tendency for young people, with even a smattering of education, to seek their fortunes in the towns. Since the towns are not yet ready to absorb migrants from the countryside in the numbers now entering the labour market, unemployment is merely transferred from the rural areas to the towns, and the urban slums which are a feature of many Latin American, African and Asian cities are the result. The drift to the towns can only be diminished or checked by the creation or preservation of the institutions and social amenities and other incentives that will contribute to inducing the rural population to stay put in the rural areas until they can be productively employed elsewhere. This involves among other things consideration of the location of new industries and potential growth centres.

The growing differential between the income of the minority who work for wages and the income of the peasant community acts as a further magnet to young people to leave the countryside for the towns. Very few developing countries have so far faced up to the complex problems of wages, incomes and profits which are involved in any attempt to level up the standard of life of the town and the rural dweller. (Tanzania is a notable exception where the policies sketched in the Arusha Declaration have now found expression in a positive Government wages policy.) A further aspect of rising urban wages is the incentive which is given thereby to labour saving methods of production and the consequent slowing down in the rate of creation of wage earning employment. Apart from the broad and difficult problems of wages policy, there exists a need for a closer study in the rural context of the problem of applying labour intensive methods to the process of economic development in the rural areas.

The problem has been well summarized as follows:—"Consideration of the place of the rural sector in the national economy, therefore, turns into an

enquiry into measures and policies for enabling the rural sector to contribute its maximum to economic growth, and into conditions under which the rural economy and the economy of the nation as a whole can grow together without developing too great a divergence in productivity, incomes, opportunities for gainful employment and levels of living".[3]

Education

Education produces its own problems. The general pattern of primary education in developing countries was set in the days when only a small proportion of children received any education at all and when even a small degree of literacy enabled young people to gain employment as clerks and shop assistants and so share in the cash economy. Nowadays the rising standard of qualifications and the relatively fewer opportunities exclude those with only primary education from such participation. Nevertheless primary schools continue to produce an increasing army of young people with no chance of secondary education who would rather seek unskilled work in towns than revert to the subsistence agriculture of their parents, not realizing that even unskilled work is hard to come by, and that the almost certain prospect for nine out of every ten is unemployment, and near-starvation.

Successful rural development must be accompanied by a radical re-thinking of current attitudes to primary education and a revision of the school curriculum to accord more suitably with rural development. At the same time, such a revised curriculum would have to provide, equally for rural as for urban children, a ladder to the highest educational levels for those capable of using it. What is clear is that the most promising geographical areas on which initially to expend educational effort are those where rural development is already holding out hopes of a better life.

Support for such views comes from the Fourth Commonwealth Education Conference held in February-March 1968, where education for economic and social development and agricultural education were discussed in some detail. The Conference Report[4] emphasized the importance of "programmes of functional adult education based on the way of life and the existing and potential occupations of the people concerned" and concluded that "primary and other school education in rural areas . . . needed urgent review if it was to be meaningful for rural education".

It is agreed that some increase in the resources available for programmes of adult education and training might make a valuable contribution to economic development. Institutions such as multi-purpose rural training centres will need to be developed from their present experimental stage to form centres from which co-ordinated extension work emanates, where the results of extension work are evaluated and functional literacy campaigns initiated. These areas of work will need buttressing and supporting by the fullest use of the mass media of communication, where necessary the special preparation of reading material. It is axiomatic that an expansionist policy for adult education in these fields must compete with the funds desired for the still

[3] Tarlok Singh in *The Rural Base for National Development:* Papers and Impressions of the Sixth Cambridge Conference on Development Problems, 1968. Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee, 1968.

[4] *Cmnd.* 3624, 1968.

expanding but inadequate primary school systems. The increasing interest of UNDP, the World Bank, UNESCO and other educational donors as well as Commonwealth Education Co-operation in this and other aspects of rural development has been noted.

Women have a major part to play in the promotion of rural development. Their contribution at the village level as the focus of the family, as home-makers and cultivators, is already considerable, and much can be done to raise the levels of rural family living simply and directly by providing tuition in farming, home economics, and the basic elements of nutrition, as well as more general adult education with due attention to local customs. It is, however, insufficient to consider women and girls only as recipients of functional education. Consideration needs to be given to the part which they could valuably be trained to play as rural school teachers and perhaps particularly as women extension workers. At higher levels still qualified women could valuably be associated with rural development planning, in particular in consideration of the part to be played by women, in participating with men in contributing to the economic development of the countryside and its natural resources.

It would, of course, be naïve to think that a progressive rural situation can be created by educational reforms alone. Other reforms are likely to be needed if the new skills and new attitudes stimulated by education are to be given scope.

Economic Importance of Agriculture

Agriculture is at the heart of rural development. It is not only a means of livelihood for up to 90 per cent of the population of developing countries and a source of employment for much of the youth, but also a key factor in national economic development, through food production, through cash crops and overseas marketing of primary produce. There is a critical inter-dependence between agriculture and industrial growth at every stage of the development process. In the first instance, manufacturing industries frequently arise out of the need to process agricultural produce. At a later stage, it is the prosperity of the rural community – the main internal market – which is the limiting factor over a substantial area of secondary industry, affecting producers of agricultural inputs as well as those concerned with satisfying consumption demands. To the extent that these industries are tied to their markets, they can lead to the creation of small industries in rural areas (manufacturing implements for example) and provide employment in ancillary service industries.

Rising agricultural incomes are an important source of the investment funds necessary to maintain economic development.

It is not only a question of increasing production of export crops, important though these may be. It is necessary also for these countries to develop the internal market for primary products by increased specialization at the individual farmer level, i.e. a widespread movement from subsistence to cash farming in products traded and consumed internally.

There are certain basic requirements without which agricultural development cannot take place and which are universal. They are that the basic technical knowledge exists, together with the means of communicating and

applying it; that the physical environment is favourable for the type of development required; that the community has the incentive and the urge to improve itself; and that there is an accessible market for its products within a sound price structure. There is no single method of ensuring subsequent development, even when these basic requirements are met. There are, however, a number of inter-related factors controlling, not only the rate, but the pattern of all agricultural development, among them the system of land tenure; the quality coverage and effectiveness of agricultural extension services, and the contribution of the private sector; the ability of the farmer to obtain seeds, fertilizers and other inputs; institutions, co-operative and otherwise, for the supply and distribution of credit and inputs; the balance between hand labour and mechanization; the development of communications and markets, both internal and overseas. All these must form part of an integrated programme for rural development.

Assessment of the progress of such an integrated programme can be achieved through the economic yard-stick of the net increase in income from farming and associated activities, which can usefully demonstrate results both to individuals and to Governments, to whom it may confirm the economic importance of rural development.

It has not been the purpose of the Working Group to produce a general dissertation on the subject of rural development, and the foregoing outline of the problem is intended as no more than a framework against which its scale and scope can be seen. Nor is it the view of the Working Group that any early and dramatic change can be effected in the direction and character of aid or of economic development planning. A shift of emphasis is already apparent at international and, increasingly, at national level, and we should take such initiatives as are open to us to help this movement of opinion along, bearing in mind the residual sensitivity of some developing countries to reminders about the importance of agriculture. (The reactions of the Turkish representatives at a recent meeting of the O.E.C.D. Consortium to suggestions that they should be concentrating more on the rural areas show that this sensitivity is not confined to countries with a colonial past.)

In the long term, population control may provide an answer to the growing unemployment problem and the United Kingdom and other donors should give every support to initiatives designed to reduce the present high birth rates in the developing countries of the world.

The subject of rural development lends itself to generalities which can conceal its complexities and minimize its pitfalls. Developments which affect so closely such basic preoccupations as land, crops and social organization, require a high degree of acceptance and involvement by those affected and a deeper degree of understanding of the human values and institutions being interfered with, than are customarily vouchsafed to the outsider. It follows that schemes of rural development are unlikely to succeed unless they are wholeheartedly adopted by the governments concerned, have the active support and understanding of those affected by the plans, and effective administrative arrangements by local people can be assured. *Aid will be most effective in this field, therefore, where it reinforces local effort.*

Given the wide range of activities involved, it is impossible to describe with any precision the forms in which aid might most effectively be given.

Bearing in mind the reservations contained in preceding paragraphs, it is possible, however, to make the following proposals:

(a) SURVEYS AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES

The preliminary or "baseline" survey of existing conditions (social survey and feasibility study) is a pre-requisite to any rural development project. Assistance with such surveys would be a practical form of help to governments who wanted it. On occasion, consultants might be used for a project where technical problems predominate. A critical survey of a partially successful scheme already launched might reveal ways in which further expertise and investment could be grafted on to make it more effective. It is of vital importance that surveys should centre on the motivations for improvements.

(b) ADMINISTRATION

(i) Programmes must be balanced to suit the strength of the local administration and should not be carried out solely under expatriate control. There will be certain projects (as in Kenya at the present time) however where the administrative experience, drive and enthusiasm of the hand-picked expatriate may be the necessary catalyst to bring together into a coherent whole the threads of local purpose. The small number of administrators of this type who might be needed ought to present little difficulty in recruitment.

(ii) Since the concept of rural development must rest on an integrated and team approach involving a number of specialities and disciplines, co-ordination and control of effort are particular problems. The "development block" system and district team are among the methods adopted to achieve it at local level.

(iii) At all levels, training and advisory work will be called for, and it is here perhaps that well directed aid could be most fruitful.

(iv) The importance of the social factors underlines the need for agronomists and other specialists to understand these factors. The annual Cambridge Conferences are valuable as a meeting place for agriculturalists and sociologists. The University of Reading has developed post-graduate courses for agricultural extension staff, based on a theoretical and practical treatment of the problems of agricultural change and development. The work has been developed along lines which cater for the needs, not only of students from the United Kingdom, but also of overseas students, including the developing countries of the tropical regions. The scope for further use of such courses and any necessary expansion to meet special needs might be examined.

(v) The way in which land is held and occupied (i.e. its tenure) is obviously of fundamental importance. Some measure of land reform (i.e. tenurial change) may be essential and this demands administrative capability of a high order, because land is always a very tender subject. In developing countries customary tenure is frequently suited only to subsistence agriculture and is an obstacle to improved development. It is important to reduce such tenure progressively

to some form of recorded title, if proper development is to be secured. A principal problem is how to reconcile "received" law and customary law with a view to one law applicable to all land. In this field, and in the field of land administration generally, we have built up a wealth of experience not readily available elsewhere.

(c) EDUCATION

(i) The Fourth Commonwealth Education Conference noted as potential fields for Commonwealth co-operation in connection with *functional adult education* (not meaning by this purely vocational) and agricultural education generally, the institution of applied research and training programmes and the production of suitably designed teaching materials, including both printed matter and the newer teaching media. These, including the provision of trainers and planners to work as part of teams promoting rural development at national and regional levels, would seem appropriate for consideration as avenues for assistance.

(ii) Community education through programmes of community development, combined with a leadership training, has made, and continues to make, a significant contribution to the creation of dynamic but socially stable rural communities. Again, the need to extend local loyalties to encompass loyalty to national objectives is an imperative which means a significant change in social attitudes. Programmes of this kind have a major role to play in plans for accelerated rural development and adult education in a variety of forms has proved to be an essential part of the process of rural development. Assistance in advising on field programmes and in the training of national personnel for work in these related fields of action continues to develop.

(iii) Since population limitation and family planning are widely considered to be essential to viable long-term rural development, assistance could valuably be made available (for countries which have adopted family planning as national policy) towards the education of public opinion and the changing of social attitudes in these matters, as well as more specific training in techniques.

Donor Problems

It is recognized that a particular problem deriving from the nature of rural development is the high proportion of local costs and the small import content. This also accentuates the problem of presentation of projects for bilateral or international aid. The World Bank, for example, has apparently found it difficult to implement a policy of increasing aid to the rural sector for lack of suitable projects. Some study by the Ministry of Overseas Development of this technical problem might well be of value, particularly in its relationship to the problem of recurrent versus capital expenditure aid. An important by-product of any preliminary survey under technical assistance arrangements might often be the subsequent preparation on behalf of the recipient country of a comprehensive plan for consideration by potential aid donors. One necessary warning at this point must be against small-scale but relatively expensive projects which cannot be developed on a wider scale and

are therefore incapable of extension. Conversely, however, where it can inspire wider-scale national projects, aid to rural development can have a valuable pilot and demonstrative function. Moreover, since recurrent costs must be held at a sustainable level, the economic soundness of each rural development project must be a primary consideration.

Conclusion

The Second Development Decade will begin in 1970. Already an atmosphere of disillusionment surrounds the progress of the first. What is apparent also is that 1970 will find most developing countries faced with serious and growing unemployment, particularly among young people. The consequent hopelessness and frustration may well prove a more serious impediment to social and political progress than the more publicized fears of food shortage. Rural development is not a complete answer; but among the limited range of possibilities open with existing resources, it offers an opportunity to soften the impact of the harsh economic realities of the population explosion. There are therefore compelling reasons for a more positive approach in our aid programme to the problems of the rural areas.

Provincial and Local Government in Zambia

By WILLIAM TORDOFF

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In November 1968 President Kaunda announced administrative reforms which were much more sweeping than this author had expected when he wrote on "Provincial and District Government in Zambia" earlier that year. Under the former structure, which was discussed in two articles appearing in this Journal,[1] each of Zambia's eight provinces was under the charge of a Minister of State. The latter was supported administratively by a resident secretary and politically by one or more presidential public relations assistants and up to four political assistants. Each district was administered by a (civil service) district secretary who, like the resident secretary above him, was responsible to the Provincial and District Government Division of the President's Office. Supervision of rural local authorities was undertaken by a separate cadre of local government officers who were employed by the Ministry of Local Government. Under these arrangements, decision-making was highly centralized in Lusaka, giving rise to local feelings of frustration in dealing, for example, with development matters.

The most important aspects of the recent administrative reforms were to post a Cabinet Minister and a permanent secretary to each province, to politicize the district administration, and to create a new administrative service by merging at all levels, officers of the Provincial and District Government Division of the President's Office and the Ministry of Local Government. This article comments on these reforms, which are designed to achieve the following principal objects:

(i) "to ensure as far as possible direct contact between the Cabinet, as the central policy-making body of the Government, and the people in the Provinces and districts whose well-being must be the main objective of all Government activity, with the aim of accelerating development of the rural areas;

(ii) to revive the village as a basic unit of administration in the rural areas and make it an effective unit for development;

(iii) to bring home to the people the need to strive constantly for economic and social progress through the development of both self-reliance and mutual co-operation; and

(iv) to ensure that the Government's development plans are implemented vigorously by increasing productivity through co-operatives and

[1] *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VII, No. 3, July 1968, and VII, No. 4, October 1968. Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, issued in Lusaka on 1 February 1969, contained a statement of Government policy but experience has indicated that it will have to be amended in certain respects. This article incorporates the changes which have taken place in governmental practice up to July 1969.

by encouraging village industry through controlled village re-grouping."[2]

At the Provincial Level

The Cabinet Ministers based in Lusaka are to formulate policies and plan departmental programmes on a national scale after consulting the provincial Ministers. Responsibility for formulating national policies in the sphere of provincial and local government is vested in a Minister of State for Provincial and Local Government and (under him) the Permanent Secretary, Provincial and Local Government Division in the President's Office. They are answerable directly to the President, an arrangement which will enable the latter to oversee the working of the new system and reinforce the authority of the Minister of State in his dealings with provincial Cabinet Ministers.

The permanent secretary of the Provincial and Local Government Division is *primus inter pares* in relation to the permanent secretaries in the provinces. He makes recommendations on policy matters concerning civil servants to the Secretary-General of the Government, the new head of the civil service and a Minister of Cabinet rank. He controls the vote of the division, under which provision is made for personal emoluments and other recurrent expenditure of the provincial ministries. He is also responsible for devising a common staffing and organizational structure and for controlling the movement of staff in all the provincial Ministries. In the past, administrative officers of the Provincial and District Government were subject to frequent transfer; if the same policy is now pursued, it will also affect officials of the former Ministry of Local Government, which had a better record in maintaining staff continuity.

Provincial Ministers will receive all Cabinet papers and attend Cabinet meetings in the same way as their colleagues in Lusaka. The new Cabinet will meet less frequently than the old one – once or twice a month instead of weekly – and will consider only major policy matters[3] (often not the case in the past.) Provincial Ministers will therefore help to shape government policy on all subjects, including those which do not relate to their respective provinces. Like the Ministers of State who serve under them (one for each province), Ministers are of course M.P.s[4] and members of the UNIP national council; two of them are also members of the ruling party's central committee. National duties will therefore take Ministers frequently away from their provincial headquarters. This is to be regretted. On the other hand, it is obviously essential that the Ministers should be fully aware of the policies of the Ministries in Lusaka if they are to co-ordinate the work of these Ministries at provincial level. They must also keep abreast of thinking in the party, with which they will work closely in the provinces (though not as office-holders – UNIP has no provincial structure).

Within his province, the Minister is the personal, political representative

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[2] Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[3] President Kaunda's Speech to UNIP delegates at Mulungushi, 9 November 1968, Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, 8 November 1968 (mimeo.), p. 22.

[4] Constitutionally, each Minister or Junior Minister *must* be an M.P. A Minister of State ranks as a Junior Minister. Constitution of Zambia, ss. 44 and 125.

of the President, by whom he is appointed.[5] He is directly responsible for the functions of the Provincial and Local Government Division. His vital role lies in the sphere of development: he is the central government's "agent for development" in his province. Like his predecessor, the Minister of State, he is the chairman of the provincial development committee as well as other provincial bodies, and he is responsible for co-ordinating and supervising generally the activities of all government departments represented in the province. Supervision does not, however, amount to control. Provincial representatives of central government Ministries (such as the Ministry of Rural Development, an omnibus Ministry which includes the Departments of Agriculture, Forestry, Water Affairs and Community Development) remain administratively and financially responsible to their parent Ministries in Lusaka. The provincial Minister also fulfils an educative and mobilizing role. It is his responsibility to see that the people understand government policies and procedures, and to evoke their enthusiastic response in improving productivity in all fields. He has a control function, though responsibility for maintaining law and order is primarily the duty of the police.

Each provincial Minister has a permanent secretary, who is the supreme civil service disciplinary authority within the province, having been designated as "supervising officer" for all departments by the Public Service Commission. As sub-warrant holder from the permanent secretaries of the Ministries in Lusaka, he accounts to them for expenditure on provincial development projects. Subject to certain conditions, he can correspond directly with the central Ministries and will maintain close contact with them by attending regular meetings of all permanent secretaries. He is also required to visit Parliament from time to time.

The permanent secretary of the province is supported by an assistant secretary, whose duty is to co-ordinate and control the work of the subordinate staff. Chief among the latter are a provincial local government officer and two administrative officers, of whom one undertakes general duties, including staffing and liaison with other departments, and the other deals with development matters. There is also a finance officer in charge of a provincial accounting unit.[6] While the staff of this unit has been seconded from the Finance Division of the Vice-President's Office, most administrative personnel have been drawn from the existing Provincial and District Government and Local Government staffs in the provinces. Thus, the former resident secretary has been replaced by an assistant secretary; the former assistant resident secretary is now administrative officer (general duties); and the development officer is the administrative officer responsible for development matters. At first the provincial local government officer became administrative officer (local government) but has recently resumed his old title in order to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Act.[7]

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[5] The paragraphs which follow are largely based on Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969 and Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.*

[6] Before the administrative reforms were announced in November 1968, steps had already been taken to re-establish the provincial accounting services which were wound up at the end of 1965.

[7] Local Government Act, No. 69 of 1965, S. 107 (1).

Table: The Organization of Government and the Party Hierarchy



At provincial level the main structural change entailed in this reorganization results from the integration of local government into provincial and district government, and the consequent abolition of a separate cadre of local government officer. These reforms parallel those made in Tanzania in 1965.[8] For the rest, the changes are mainly in personnel – in particular, the placing of a Cabinet Minister at the head of each province and the introduction of a permanent secretary. The structural changes at provincial level are therefore limited and the administrative consequences will only be important if policy decisions can now be taken locally without reference to Lusaka. So long, however, as ministerial representatives in the provinces are primarily responsible to their parent Ministries in the capital, delay will only be avoided if the personal discretion of these officers is also substantially increased. For this to happen, some of these representatives will need to be replaced by better qualified officers, now serving at headquarters.

In announcing the administrative reforms, President Kaunda stressed the need to

> "decentralize in centralism. I define this decentralization in centralism as a measure whereby through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of our Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and Government machinery in the interests of unity.
>
> In short, you decentralize to avoid regionalism . . . we should integrate more the Party and Government activities."[9]

To understand the somewhat obscure phrase "you decentralize to avoid regionalism", it is necessary to recall briefly the events of August 1967. In the elections to the UNIP central committee held that month at Mulungushi near Kabwe, the ruling party split into two main camps: a Bemba-Tonga-speaking alliance under Simon Kapwepwe, Foreign Minister and incumbent UNIP national treasurer, and a Lozi-Nyanja-speaking alliance which ranged behind Reuben Kamanga, the party and national vice-president.[10] These elections had serious divisive effects on both party and government. By 5 February 1968 the inter-party wrangling had become so severe that President Kaunda told the UNIP national council, which was then meeting in Lusaka, that he was resigning as party and national president.[11] Though he withdrew his resignation the next day, he was more anxious than ever to strengthen national unity and to check the appeal to sentiments based on tribe, province and race. Centralism – and particularly, the placing of a Cabinet Minister in every province and a governor in each district – is therefore the essential corollary of decentralization, which is itself regarded as necessary both to promote rural development and to secure the people's involvement in the activities of government. Moreover, an important aspect of centralism is that the Cabinet Minister, like most of the district governors below him, serves outside his "home" area. This policy is not new – it had been applied increasingly to provincial Ministers of State and their political subordinates from 1966 onwards – but had been temporarily jeopardized as a result of the

[8] William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 113–4
[9] Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.* p. 19.
[10] See Robert I. Rotberg, "Tribalism and Politics in Zambia", *Africa Report*, December 1967, pp. 29–35.
[11] *The Times* (London), 15 February 1968.

central committee elections at Mulungushi. Following the latter, President Kaunda had been obliged to drop his declared intention of having every UNIP candidate for the 1968 general election stand in a constituency to which he was a "stranger".

Two (and originally three) of the provincial Ministers were members of the Cabinet in the last Administration,[12] while all except one of the others were Junior Ministers. The exception – Mr. F. Mulikita – was a permanent secretary before his appointment to the Cabinet. His appointment, as well as that of former Minister of State Mr. M. M. Sakubita as provincial permanent secretary, indicates that Zambia is following the example of Tanzania in making some senior political and administrative posts interchangeable. Indeed, Mr. Sakubita has made a double switch, having been a civil servant before he was appointed an Under-Minister in 1964. So, too, has Mr. John Mwanakatwe, the new Secretary-General to the Government, who also entered politics from the civil service: he became a parliamentary secretary in 1962 and was a Cabinet Minister from January 1964 until December 1968. As Secretary-General, he is now not only head of the civil service, but also a Minister of Cabinet rank, responsible to the President for the policy-formulating and executing functions of both the central and provincial Ministries;[13] this post therefore bridges the gap between public administration and politics. The former secretary to the Cabinet and head of the civil service, Mr. Valentine Musakanya, became Minister of State for Finance and Technical Education in the Vice-President's Office on 1 February 1969 – the date on which Mwanakatwe assumed duty as Secretary-General.

At the district level

Whereas provincial administration was politicized in September 1964, when Under-Ministers were first appointed to each of Zambia's eight provinces, the districts remained in the charge of an administrative officer with the title of district secretary. This has now been changed and a politician, called a district governor, has been appointed to head each one of the 53 districts and sub-districts into which the country is divided for administrative purposes. This step represents an important reversal of previous government policy, and it is a matter for surmise why it has been taken when at least the early experience of Tanzania showed that the political advantages of this system were more than offset by the administrative disadvantages.

The political advantages are perhaps threefold. First, district governors should be able to fill a mobilizing role more effectively than civil servants, and President Kaunda told them that he wanted the "message of humanism and its cornerstone of active self-reliance to permeate through every village in your area".[14] Secondly, to confer more powers on the district secretary as a means of building up an efficient local administration on Kenyan lines[15]

[12] Mr. Mainza Chona, secretary-general of UNIP, was appointed Minister in charge of the Central Province in December 1968; he is now Minister without Portfolio. Mr. John Mwanakatwe, the Secretary-General to the Government, is responsible for the Central Province. If he is included in the count, the number of provincial Ministers who were members of the Cabinet in the last Administration remains at three.

[13] Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[14] The President was addressing his remarks to potential district governors. Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[15] *Cf.* Cherry Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, November 1966, pp. 205–6.

(a proposal that was seriously considered in 1968) might have created strong feelings of resentment in some UNIP regional secretaries, as well as in the political assistants on the staff of provincial Ministers of State. The introduction of a political head obviates this particular problem, although it would be rash to assume that the relations between the district governor and local UNIP politicians will always be cordial. In the third place, the appointment of district governors was a means of absorbing middle-level UNIP leaders who had been made parliamentary secretaries at the centre or given political posts in the offices of the Ministers of State. It follows that the main criterion for the appointment of most district governors has been political reliability (and perhaps redundancy in their old jobs) rather than proved administrative ability. There is therefore the danger, as occurred in Tanzania, of a district administration weakened by too many sub-standard governors. The main Tanzanian solution to this problem was to appoint more civil servants to political office. This could happen in Zambia because President Kaunda followed up his announcement that the district governorship is "another one of those posts that might be interchangeable, that is between politicians and civil servants" by appointing a number of civil servants as district governors. Postings will be made on merit and for a district governor (as well as a Cabinet Minister) "the acid test" of merit will be the success which he makes in his area of promoting development.[16]

Administratively, the district governor is served by a district secretary who acts, as it were, as his "permanent secretary". This officer is to advise the governor on all questions of policy at the district level, to assist in the formulation of policy, and to ensure that it is implemented. Below him are two administrative officers (or assistants), of whom one deals with local government subjects and supervises the rural local authorities, and the other undertakes general duties, including accounts. (See table.) As at provincial level, the staff for the district governor's office has been found mainly from the previous Provincial and District Government and Local Government staffs in the district.[17] The district local government officer has now become (or has been replaced by) the administrative officer (local government), though it is intended that he shall also undertake general duties if his local government duties allow. It remains to be seen whether this arrangement will make for the better utilization of manpower than the old one. From 1966 onwards the Ministry of Local Government steadily withdrew local government staff from the districts in order to build up provincial teams and to leave district local government officers responsible for two or more rural (and sometimes township) councils. Under the revised structure, the immediate effect of increasing supervisory staff at district level has been to create a serious staffing shortage at provincial level. Temporarily at least, the financial control over local authorities has been weakened.

The district governor is the political head of his district and has overall responsibility for its good administration. He is appointed personally by the President and is immediately accountable to his respective provincial Minister. He is the chief government co-ordinating officer in his district "with particular reference to the task of political and economic development."

[16] Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.
[17] Cabinet Office Circular, No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

Like the provincial Minister above him, his job is to supervise, rather than control, the work of other government departments operating in his area. If civil servants in these departments neglect their duties and will not respond to his advice, he must report them to his Minister and permanent secretary, as well as to the senior departmental officer in the province; but he himself cannot discipline civil servants. He can take minor policy decisions affecting his district, particularly in the field of development, but any such decision must be based on prior consultation with the district departmental heads.[18]

The district governor is the chairman of the various committees established in his district. Thus, he takes over the chairmanship of the district education council from the district education officer and that of the district development committee from the regional secretary of UNIP. He is required by the President to take early steps to set up development committees at the sub-district level. At the grassroots level he must, wherever appropriate and possible, establish a village productivity committee (called a section productivity committee in urban areas) and make such a committee an effective local agent for administration and development. The district governor has the discretion to decide the best way to organize these basic units, in the light of local circumstances. It is however envisaged that village and section productivity committees will send representatives to the ward development committees, through which the people's needs will be conveyed to the district development committee. The latter, in turn, will work to the provincial development committee. Moreover, communication will be two-way – the new committee structure will enable government information and influence to permeate down to village level.[19]

What is not at present clear is how the various development committees will relate to the rural council(s) already firmly established in the district. In the past, the practice has been for the council to be represented on the district development committee; this arrangement will continue. Moreover, each councillor has been expected to establish a committee in his own ward. Some councillors did so, but others did not. Such ward committees as were established were solely responsible to the local authorities, and the district development committee had next to no dealings with them. Under the new organization there is no suggestion that the district development committee will become (as in Tanzania) a committee of the rural council; though there is much to be said for such an arrangement, it would be anomalous so long as the district governor, the chairman of the development committee, and most of the committee members are not themselves rural councillors.[20] Again, it must be assumed that, in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of agencies for development, the ward committees already established by rural councillors (as well as the village development committees set up by the Department of Community Development)[21] will be absorbed by the new bodies to be established by the district governor. These ward committees will now, for the first time, be integrated into the development committee structure; the danger to

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[20] The anomaly notwithstanding, Tanzania has operated this system since area commissioners were first appointed in 1962–63. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania, op. cit.*, pp. 119 and 122.

[21] Now a department within the Ministry of Rural Development.

be avoided is that the rural council is not left isolated in local development matters.

In this and other respects a great deal will depend on the good sense and tact of the district governor. If these qualities are lacking, the best administrative structure will fail. Personal relations will be vitally important in a number of directions. In the first place, the governor must have a harmonious working relationship with his district secretary. In Republican Ghana friction quickly developed between the (political) district commissioner and the government agent, leading to the withdrawal of the latter to regional headquarters. Several cases of disagreement also arose in Tanzania, sometimes resulting in the transfer of the (civil service) area secretary to another station. In Zambia, the fact that it is the district secretary who continues to have financial and accounting responsibilities for government activities[22] is an understandable provision and parallels the arrangement made in Tanzania; but the district governor may resent any curb on (for example) his official travelling or the use which he makes of the office telephone.

In the second place, the district governor will need to cultivate good relations with the district departmental heads, who will be quick to take offence if the governor exceeds his instructions and seeks to preside over the day-to-day running of their departments. Thirdly, the governor will have to co-operate closely with the chairman of the rural council and the regional secretary of UNIP. In some districts, these offices will be held by the same person; in others they will be held separately, while in a few districts – Chome Rural Council in the Southern Province is one example – the council chairman will be a member of the African National Congress opposition. Governors of nearly all districts in the Southern and Barotse Provinces, where the ANC captured most of the seats in the general election of December 1968,[23] will have to be sensitive to local feelings. They will need to win the co-operation of the chiefs who (said President Kaunda, speaking generally) still wield "tremendous influence" in their own areas.[24] Difficulties are likely to arise even in one-party (UNIP) areas – notably the Northern, Luapula and Eastern Provinces – if the district governor abuses his officially declared "precedence within his district over all other district politicians and officials".[25]

All district governors are now members of the UNIP national council and some are also M.P.s. Regular visits to Lusaka will enable them to keep abreast not only of government policy as a whole but also of the policies being shaped in the various government Ministries, whose work they are required to co-ordinate at district level. On the other hand, they will not be able to carry out their constituency duties. There is also the danger that the decision-making process may be retarded by the frequent absence of the governor from his district. If the new National Assembly meets for substantially longer periods than the old one, the Government may have to consider whether it is advisable for district governors to continue serving in Parliament.

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[22] Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[23] The ANC won 12 out of the 14 constituencies in the Southern Province and 8 of the 11 constituencies in the Barotse Province. In the country as a whole the ANC captured 23 out of 105 elected seats; UNIP won 81 and an Independent one.

[24] Seminar of Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and District Governors, Lusaka, 30 December 1968; Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 2223/68, 30 December 1968, p. 7.

[25] Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

Staffing

The success of any new organization depends on finding adequate manpower to service it. The trend since independence has been to withdraw the most competent officers from the field and transfer them to central government Ministries; the Provincial Administration was therefore denuded in favour of the centre. A beginning has now been made in reversing this process. Reversal was justified because the development of the rural areas, to which President Kaunda's government gives top priority, was being seriously impeded by the over-centralization of decision-making in Lusaka. Moreover, because it has not been possible in the past to examine thoroughly the problems involved in the efficient manning of the civil service, some central government officers have not been fully employed or utilized to the best advantage.

The transfer of top personnel to the provinces is the first step in the building up of a high-level administrative service, whose direction both at central government and at provincial and district levels will be in the hands of a unified command. The provincial permanent secretary is the lynch-pin of the new service. Moreover, since Provincial and District Government and Local Government staffs serve on similar scales, they can be absorbed into this service without much difficulty. But much remains to be done if President Kaunda's aim of "an efficient and effective administration" is to be achieved.[26]. Serving officers of poor quality will have to be dispensed with and new recruits attracted – for example, from the University of Zambia, whose graduate output will increase substantially from December 1969 onwards. Moreover, efficient training arrangements will need to be developed. The present structure will have to be rationalized[27] and training broadened in scope in order to fit new recruits to undertake both general administrative duties and more specific functions such as the supervision of rural local authorities. This, as well as the retraining of existing officers of good potential, is essential if a flexible service is to be developed.

The new provincial and local government service must not of course be considered in isolation from the public service as a whole. The effect on the central administration could be serious if a large number of senior officers were transferred too quickly to the provinces. As we have seen, Ministers and permanent secretaries have been released for field service through a process of reducing the number of Ministries at the centre.[28] One consequence is that the load on the remaining Ministers and their permanent secretaries will be considerably increased. It is true that the presence of a Cabinet Minister in each province should mean that more decisions are taken locally; moreover, the level of policy decision-making is now extended downwards to that of the district governor – previously the lowest level was that of the Minister of State. At the same time, it is obvious that the more successful provincial Ministers and their staffs are in promoting local development, the greater will

[26] Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[27] Hitherto, officers on the staff of Provincial and District Government have been trained at the National Institute of Public Administration, Lusaka, while the training of local government officers (employed by the former Ministry of Local Government) and local authority staff has been undertaken both at N.I.P.A. and at the Local Authority Training Centre at Chalimbana. Training for Community Development personnel has been provided at Monze and Kitwe.

[28] A Ministry of National Guidance has subsequently been created at the centre, to serve as the power-house of ideas on humanism.

be the demands that are placed on Ministries with development functions in the field. In fact, several Ministers already carry a heavy load under the reorganized ministerial structure,[29] and a great deal will depend on the calibre of the Ministers of State who serve under them.

Again, if – as is likely – it becomes accepted government policy to allocate an increased number of graduates to provincial and local government, the result will be to retard Zambianization of both the public and private sectors. With over 70 per cent of administrative (as distinct from professional and technical) posts in the civil service already filled by Zambians, the Zambianization of the public sector is no longer a live political issue. But this is not the case in the private sector, and the new policy may therefore embarrass the mining companies (and other industrial and business concerns) as well as the Government.[30]

Some general conclusions

On 30 December 1968, President Kaunda stated that in the past development had been retarded because of

> "the snail-like speed with which the wheels of the bureaucratic machinery of Government turn in the formulation of policy and the transmission of policy decisions to the field operators for execution."[31]

The posting of a Cabinet Minister and permanent secretary to provincial headquarters should certainly make for speedier and more realistic decision-making. Development plan implementation should therefore be improved. Instead of having to wait for a ruling from Lusaka, it is now intended that field operators will be "able to obtain most of the decisions from the Provincial headquarters", where funds for development projects will be held.[32] Permanent secretaries in central Ministries are required to sub-warrant automatically to their counterparts in the provinces all funds for projects which have been designated as provincial development projects by the Permanent Secretary of the Development Division in the Office of the Vice-President. These are important gains which should help to remove the frustration felt by the former Ministers of State and the provincial development committees.[33] But the situation is improved, not transformed. Constitutionally, as we have noted, the provincial Minister himself and his Minister of State must be M.P.s. If both are absent from the province for substantial periods at the same time, delays in the decision-making process could continue to occur. Moreover, in important matters reference will still have to be made to Lusaka since the primary responsibility of the ministerial representatives in the province is to their parent Ministry. In other words the replacement, at the head of the province, of the Minister of State by a Cabinet Minister will not alter the fact that the provincial development committee is assigned the task of co-ordinating individual ministerial projects but has limited control over them. Perhaps, therefore, the corollary to decentraliza-

[29] Examples are the Vice-President and the Minister of Rural Development.

[30] Since the above was written, the Zambian Government has taken over majority control of the country's copper industry.

[31] Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 2223/68, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] See Tordoff, "Provincial and District Government in Zambia", Part I, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

tion is to confer executive powers on the provincial development committee; this has not yet been done, nor has the committee become a planning body.

The main intention of the administrative reforms is "to make the rural economy a dynamic force in the development of the country".[34] Whether or not this aim is achieved will depend above all on the district governor. In the formal terms of government policy, he is responsible for the development of his district, and will work through the departmental agencies and the district development committee. At present, however, there is no statutory basis for the powers of district governors and the latter are slowly learning that there are severe legal and financial restraints on what they can do. The President has in fact placed most stress on the informal powers (and duties) of district governors. The governor's influence and that of all the institutions under his control must be felt in the wards and villages throughout the district. He must unite the people behind the government, foster the spirit of co-operation and self-reliance by encouraging village regrouping, the growth of small-scale industries, private Zambian business enterprise, and increased agricultural production.[35]

Though the district governor will not himself normally hold office in the ruling party, he must work closely with the UNIP regional secretary to make the party an effective instrument of development. Four designated party committees are to be established at regional, constituency and branch (as well as at provincial and national) levels,[36] while village and section committees are to be set up at the lowest reaches of the party organization. In the public sector, the district governor is to establish village and section productivity committees, as well as ward development committees, and the success of these committees will largely depend on the creative initiative and organizational ability of the governor. The latter will not have any statutory powers over the rural council(s) in his area, but supervision will be exercised by the local government section of his office. Because of this, and also because the great majority of councils throughout the country are controlled by UNIP, the governor's influence will be brought to bear on the workings of representative local government in the rural areas. (A uniform system of local government will be retained, but city and municipal councils – which are administratively and financially viable in a way that the rural councils are not —will deal directly with the Provincial and Local Government Division of the President's Office except perhaps in routine matters).

The district governors may have some initial success in mobilizing local resources and effort for purposes of development, and in fostering a spirit of co-operation among the people. But, in the long term, the district governor who successfully fills a mobilizing role will fail unless he can also direct local enthusiasm into constructive channels. Effective institution building is

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[34] Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 2223/68, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[35] Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 2223/68, *op. cit. passim*, and Background Paper No. 84/68, *op. cit. passim*. These speeches suggest strongly that President Kaunda has studied carefully the writings of Julius Nyerere, particularly *After the Arusha Declaration, Socialism and Rural Development*, and *Education for Self-Reliance*.

[36] These are the economic, cultural, political, and press and publicity committees; a co-ordinating committee will also be formed at national level. Economic and political committees already exist at provincial and regional levels, Zambia Information Services, Background No. 84/68, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

essential if Zambia is not to share the early experience of Tanzania when, following the introduction of area commissioners in 1962, unplanned and unco-ordinated self-help projects abounded. Since most of the district governors lack administrative experience, they will be heavily dependent on the advice of the administrators under them. It is therefore an urgent task to improve the quality of administration at the district level. This is now being done but the process will inevitably be a slow one: it is dependent on manpower surveys and job analysis reports, as well as on enlisting new recruits and devising effective training programmes. In the meantime, the provincial Cabinet Minister will need to hold his political subordinates on a tight rein. In particular, if the people's confidence in the new system is to be retained, he will have to act quickly in order to check any abuse by district governors of their real but largely unspecified powers.[37]

The Zambian Government has stated that "It is inevitable that this major administrative re-organization and re-orientation of Government machinery will give rise to many problems."[38] Some of these problems have been discussed in this article. They are not insuperable given the dedication, good will and mutual co-operation of all political leaders and senior civil servants who are involved. It is much to President Kaunda's credit that he has taken radical steps to devise a new provincial and local government system which will, he believes, serve his people better than the one which it has replaced.

[37] There were several early instances of such abuse, though the most flagrant were corrected as a result of prompt action by the appropriate authority in Lusaka. Cf. *Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), 13 and 15 January 1969. It remains to be seen whether the provincial Cabinet Minister will intervene to check abuse of power in all cases; like the district governor, he is himself subject to strong local pressures.

[38] Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Administrative Problems in Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj

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Political Developments

The *Panchayati Raj* was ushered in during the Nehruean era with the characteristic taratantara as being a revolutionary concept of democratic decentralization. It was imagined that the rural population would move forward in the task of transforming its age-old tradition-bound and often miserable life. It was "discovered" that unless the people at the grass-roots level actively participated in the task of rebuilding the nation the Five Year Plans could not be successful. The existing Community Development Projects being sponsored by officials did not solicit the local leadership and local initiative. There was a void that needed to be filled.

The moment the Report of the Committee on Plan Projects which has now been immortalized as the Balwantray Mehta Report was published, the State Governments of both Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan implemented the recommendations with almost indecent haste. It was not all altruistic love for grass-root democracy that motivated the ruling party. It was clear that the various local leaders and others who helped the ministers in obtaining their votes had to be prevented from crowding the corridors of the State Assembly with their long shopping lists of obligations they needed from the ministers in return for their help. It was also necessary that such of those as could not be accommodated in the ministries should be provided with a berth commensurate with their influence in the lower levels of government. Patronage was found a useful means to satisfy, within the Panchayat structure, the immediate ambitions of local political leaders. But the problem at State level was not so easily resolved: these local leaders with their personal contacts with the people and the funds that were diverted to the local bodies for development work began to grow too influential and powerful for the state leadership to ignore. For example all agricultural development was in the hands of the *Panchayati Raj* bodies. This meant tremendous influence in Andhra Pradesh which is essentially an agricultural area with very progressive peasantry. The demand for fertilizers and other modern "inputs" is very high and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides, loans and subsidies for agricultural purposes is in the hands of the Panchayati Raj institutions. Because of these powers, the Panchayati Raj leadership was more coveted than mere representation in the legislature. The state leadership now had to depend for their stability on the support given by these local bosses. Conscious of their new strength the local leadership could go on shifting their allegiance from one State leader to another. The ground also became fertile for this capricious game, because the Congress monolith began to crack and the writ of Congress no longer ran so strongly. Factions began to solicit the support of local leaders. It was the tail

that began to wag the dog! In the recent general elections in many places the Panchayat leadership exerted powerful influence on the ruling faction of the State leadership. So, while it was too late in the day to abolish these local government institutions, the time for reducing their powers and putting them under a certain measure of check had come.

The Elected Representative/Official Conflict

While at the political level, thinking was going on these lines, the relations between the officials and the non-officials in the Panchayati Raj system were going through a difficult stage. The Block Development Officer had almost become a powerless tool in the hands of the non-official leader, the *Samiti* (Local Authority at Block level) President. Most of the Block Development Officers longed to leave the Panchayati Raj institutions and go back to the parent departments from which they had come, while there were those content to continue in the Panchayati Raj, many who were questioned emphasized the attitude towards them displayed by the elected members they served as the reason for their wish to revert to State service.

With the influence and power these non-officials wield in their areas and the direct accessibility they have to the ministry at headquarters, they are in a position to brush aside the local officials as men of no consequence. Instances are not lacking where officials suffered at meetings extreme verbal and even physical attacks from non-officials. Where there was a protest, this has been known to result in harsh discriminatory action against the protestant. One had his domestic water supply cut off! One of the non-officials who beat a Block Development Officer was a woman![1] In neither of these two cases was any action taken against the non-officials, while the official victims suffered their humiliation. An official is often dubbed as tactless if he becomes a victim to high-handedness and is left to fend for himself. Even when official inquiries were instituted and the non-officials were found to be at fault ministerial support for disciplinary action has proved difficult to obtain.

For their part non-officials who have been questioned complain of the snobbish attitude of officials towards them, the reluctance of the city-bred to treat villagers as equals, the tendency to join in village factions – criticism less severe and more charitable than that expressed by the officials.

"The local administrator, who often despises it (the Panchyati Raj) for its lack of culture and combination of rural cunning with rural stupidity, has nevertheless to try to find ways and means of enlisting its support for policies of agricultural development."[2]

But this can be a very exasperating exercise in tact and human relations. It need not be laboured that these institutions of democratic decentralization as they must now be called euphemistically, have become hot-beds of factional feuds having their repercussions at the State headquarters or reflecting the factional feuds at State headquarters in which the local factions and feuds get inextricably mixed, thus defying any simple analysis, much less solution. The local party bosses who were operating have now acquired a legal and respectable dress. Many have no time for the uplift of the community. They

[1] See G. Ram Reddy, "*The Block Development Officer – Promise and Performance*", Journal of Administration Overseas, April 1967.
[2] A. H. Hanson *Process of Planning*, Oxford University Press, p. 241.

are too busy "politicking", gaining more henchmen and seeking to overthrow rivals. In this rural dynamics, the governmental assistance to the rural communities viz. fertilizers, pesticides, loans, subsidies for various things, frequently go to a particular favoured group of supporters in accordance with the decisions previously and privately arrived at in their group meetings. In these cases the official meetings of these Panchayati Raj bodies are a façade and their procedure is followed to satisfy the law, with the officials no more than silent and impotent spectators. As matters stand "the block level administration at times tends to get politicalized in a two-fold manner. First, the block level officials start to toe the line of their non-official political bosses and thus secure both peace and security besides sharing patronage. Secondly, they also start forging links with state level politicians to neutralize the influence of the non-official bosses at the rural local level. In sum, their time and energy gets frittered away in tasks other than development."[3]

In this predicament the local non-official leaders neither lead the people in furthering rural development and encouraging the officials to work with greater zeal nor do they leave their officials free to carry on their routine jobs officially assigned to them, which constitute at least a small measure of progress.

The Inter-Departmental Conflict

As the Panchayati Raj institutions began to take a greater share of responsibility in developmental functions (whether they fulfilled them or not), especially in agriculture (that being the most important sector in Andhra Pradesh), the need for having official leadership at the block-level oriented agriculturally became essential. In India, owing to the importance attached by the British Government to revenue collection as the prime function, the Revenue Department enjoys a certain prestige and power. The need for a sound law and order administration *inter alia*, is essential for proper revenue collection. From the historical times of Chanakya on to the Moghul times when Raja Todarmull introduced a revenue settlement and then to the British Government, the importance of Land Revenue administration as the linchpin in the whole governance has been a recognized fact. Hence it is that the most pivotal official in the Indian Government is the District Collector who is actually the District Revenue Collector. He is called variously the "eyes and ears" of the Government, the friend, philosopher and guide of the people. These top officials in the Administrative Service, having no special knowledge or training in any particular field of a technical nature have come to be styled as the "generalist" administrators, who by virtue of this disqualification became eminently qualified to co-ordinate the functions of various specialist officers. They are said to have an impartial and overall view of the needs of administration while the specialists make contending demands for their own fields of activity.

Therefore, they had to be associated with the Panchayati Raj administration. The Secretariat at headquarters, a policy-making body assisting the ministry, is also headed by men from the same service. Hence from the field to the headquarters there is a liaison reinforced by a particular *esprit de*

[3] Iqbal Narain, "The Administrative Challenge to Panchayati Raj" – *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 3, July – September 1966, p. 569.

corps. The Revenue Board, which is again a powerful body in the State Government enjoying supervisory powers over the district administration and quasi-judicial powers over disputes in revenue matters, is also headed by these generalist administrators. Any new proposal, or institution, is first referred to the Revenue Board which thereby involves itself in the project. For example, the functioning of the State Irrigation Development Board, the State Ayacut[4] Development under Irrigation Projects, minor irrigation programmes, the Intensive Agricultural District Programme, the Intensive Agricultural Area Programme, flood, fire, famine and other relief programmes, the Nagarjuna Sagar (Multi-purpose Scheme) Administration etc., are all co-ordinated by the Revenue Board in addition to its other normal administrative functions.

Much criticism has been voiced at the retention of this body as being superfluous and top-heavy and irrelevant to the development context. An Administrative Reforms Committee of the Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1964–65 and strongly recommended the abolition of the Revenue Board. But the Board has survived all attacks. It has continued to co-ordinate the activities of the various specialist departments like agriculture, engineering, animal husbandry, co-operation, industries etc., – indeed its position is such that the Revenue Administration virtually controls the State.

Thus at the State headquarters the Revenue Board is the co-ordinating body and according to the same logic at the district level the District (Revenue) Collector is the co-ordinating official.

When Panchayati Raj was ushered in, and in Andhra Pradesh, the Block became the unit of planning and extension services, the co-ordinating officer was logically the one belonging to the Revenue Department! The status and prestige of the Administrative Service, invariably under a senior minister, result in an undue superiority being accorded to revenue officials, from district collectors, secretaries, board members, down to the *Karnam* (or *Patwari*) at village level. The latter is in a very powerful position holding as he does a hereditary post and with immense local knowledge has no counterpart in any other department. He tends to be unsympathetic to Panchayati Raj institutions which he feels are responsible for a reduction in his powers. If Panchayati Raj officials are unprotected from the vagaries of non-officials, the revenue hierarchy would seem to provide too great a protection for its personnel. The vertical line of control upwards from *Karnam* to Revenue Inspector, on to *Tahsildar* in charge of a *taluk* to the Revenue divisional officer and then to the District collector, brooks very little interference from outside. Lack of co-operation between village level worker and lowly revenue official in his entrenched position, handicaps rural development and is hard to rectify.

When Panchayati Raj was introduced men of the rank of *Tahsildar*, an officer of the Revenue Department in charge of a small division of the District called the *Taluk*, were made the Block Development Officers. This was one of the grave mistakes committed at the outset itself. The Panchayati Raj concept was in effect doomed to death at its inception. These officials, concerned over the details of out-moded rules and regulations, ignorant of extension and developmental work, lacked the *élan* needed for development. They were accustomed to receiving homage from the villagers and in turn paid

[4] Ayacut is an area under a particular source of irrigation.

homage to their own superiors. To them equality of treatment, co-operation, informality were signs of weakness. This psychological factor has been responsible for the various frictions detailed in the previous paragraphs. If only the government had had the sense and imagination to infuse new blood and dynamism into this new concept of development from below, the results would not have been as sadly disappointing as they are.

Under these "generalist" officials the various extension officers function. The latter work under dual supervision – administratively under the Block Development Officer and technically under the departmental specialist officer of the District. As developmental functions began to increase, naturally the Block Development Officer[5] became increasingly incapable of carrying them out because of his lack of special knowledge. The extension officers who worked under him had to go more and more for guidance to their specialist officers in the district and the generalist supervision of the Block Development Officer became more an administrative ritual than a meaningful direction. With the implementation of intensive agricultural schemes, new schemes of rural industrialization etc., the technical officials began to grow more important.

This tendency was conveyed up to State Headquarters which made the directorate composed of technical officials of the State rank as more important than the Secretariat which is a generalist body. If we take Agriculture as an illustration this could be represented simply as shown in the following diagram



The Block Development Officer, as shown here, is not under the control of the Agricultural Officer, though he has to promote agricultural production in his block. Official correspondence between the Directorate of Agriculture and the Secretariat is replete with demands by the former to bring the Block Development Officer under the control of the District Agricultural Officer in so far as agricultural programmes are concerned and the Secretariat brushing them aside by equivocal and vague explanations. Thus a situation has developed in which, in some cases, the District Agricultural Officer never visits the Block office nor deems it fit to discuss agricultural matters with the Block Development Officer but summons the Agricultural Extension Officer and

[5] *While the Block Development Officer is seconded from the State service in which he is subordinate to the collector, as Secretary/Executive Officer of his Panchayat Samiti he is responsible for carrying out the decisions of that body – whether he is a specialist or a generalist, he is the servant of the Samiti and inevitably, whatever his capabilities, his position, as the author has already pointed out, is a delicate, difficult and often a frustrating one. (Ed.)*

gets his work done without reference to the B.D.O. The Agricultural Extension Officer in his turn, does not pay much heed to the B.D.O. since he is under the protective wing of his technical superior, the District Agricultural Officer. Thus the B.D.O. suffers a double humiliation – one, from the non-official and two, from the subordinate extension officers. His position becomes untenable in this context. This results naturally in a partial paralysis of the generalist officers because the various developmental schemes get implemented from the directorate through the technical officials at the District level and then the extension officers at the Block. Thus the technical directorates and the non-official political leadership are all that matter while the generalist administrators suffer an eclipse.

At the State Headquarters, a two-dimensional picture is obtained. From the political dimension, the local political boss has been getting more and more powerful, taking advantages that have accrued to him due to developmental schemes. In the context of the cracks in the ruling Congress monolith, he has been able to dictate his terms to the top leaders. From the administrative dimension, the technical officers, the directorates, have got themselves entrenched in the Panchayat Samitis, almost jettisoning the generalist administrators. As a result, the generalist administrators represented by the Secretariat and the Revenue Board, and the political bosses of the ruling faction had a common cause against what was developing below. It is in this context that the District Collectors' Conference that took place in the Capital on 13th and 14th April, 1967 and its deliberations culminating in the proposals made for constituting the District Development Board and the State Development Board must be examined.

The District Collectors' Conference.

– APRIL 1967 AND THE M. T. RAJU COMMITTEE.

The District Collectors' Conference that took place in this year is very significant from the far-reaching conclusions that the government took after its deliberations. Administrative measures to economize and speed up agricultural and industrial programmes were on the agenda. Ministers, secretaries and directors participated and came to the conclusion that at present no person could be held responsible for the short-falls in agriculture and other sectors, and unless responsibility could be placed squarely on the shoulders of one person, the development plan would be completely frustrated. On the other hand the non-officials' demand in Panchayati Raj was that in Andhra Pradesh an Executive Officer drawn from the Indian Administrative Services should be placed under the Chairman of the Zila Parishad with the District Collector excluded from the Panchayat administration, as is the case in the State of Maharashtra.[6] They wanted more powers for the non-officials over higher officials.

A Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. M. T. Raju, First Member, Board of Revenue, was formed to make proposals to streamline adminis-

[6] In Maharashtra State the District is the most important unit. So there the Zila Parishad is more powerful than the Zila Parishad of Andhra Pradesh. In this State the Samiti in the Block is a more important unit. The District Collector in Maharashtra is kept out of the Panchayat bodies. In Andhra Pradesh he is the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zila Parishad.

tration. The proposals were formulated immediately and without losing much time the ministry accepted the main recommendations.

Instead of giving more powers to the non-officials, as was expected by the Panchayati Raj leadership, the District Collector was now made responsible for the implementation of plans from the District level. He is now called upon to formulate and implement programmes of economic development, especially in agriculture and industry together with irrigation, animal husbandry, fisheries, co-operation and marketing.

The Collector has now been placed clearly and unequivocally in executive control of all departmental work for implementing development plans. Thus the powers of the technical directors of departments are delegated to him. The Collector's plan would be placed before the appropriate committee of the Zila Parishad to which the Presidents of the Samiti would be invited. The Collector would be the head of each of the departments concerned in development and all of them would merge with the Collector's office. All the District Officers, such as the District Agricultural Officer, will have to carry out the orders of the District Collector. The District Collector and the Zila Parishad Chairman will constitute the Zila Development Board, to which all the district officials and the non-official leaders would be invited to discuss and finalize the plans.

Again at the Divisional level, the Divisional Revenue Officer will be the reviewing authority and all the District heads of technical departments will have to furnish to him the inspection notes of their respective field staff.

The Zila Development Board will report to the State Development Board.

Inevitably the recommendations of the Committee met with vehement criticisms, Panchayati Raj supporters led by the President of their State Chamber charged the Revenue Board with trying to restore its own former position by wresting power from popular local leadership. The Minister for Revenue, V.B. Raju, was signalled out for attack as he had been a member of the Administrative Reforms Committee of 1964/5 which had recommended the abolition of the Revenue Board. Despite protest meetings and conferences the State Government would not change its mind and the Raju Committee proposals were duly implemented.

Conclusions

If a scientific study of administration teaches anything it is that mere institutional and legal changes in themselves cannot bring substantial socio-economic progress.

The introduction of the Panchayati Raj system was heralded with much political trumpeting that a new era of democratic participation was being ushered in which would result in great social and economic progress. Paul Appleby warned against such disproportionate enthusiasm. "... I am suggesting that what is done in the communities be not unduly exaggerated, be not misunderstood as constituting some transcendent kind of democratic achievement. In the long run, as India succeeds, the nature of an advancing, complicating civilization will require the transfer of a large part of this community activity into governmental bureaucracies with technical com-

petence in knowledge and technical materials which will produce enormously more per man hour."[7]

The truth needs to be told without mincing words. The Panchayat bodies have not only failed miserably in their mission but have created innumerable conflicts in the rural areas. The extent of development achieved has been quite inadequate, besides crime has increased, caste feelings which lay dormant have come into the surface.

Mr. B. P. R. Vithal, one of the authors of the Raju Committee proposals had long before expressed his ideas regarding the Collector's position as Co-ordinator among the technical officials of the district.

"Considerations, both of specialization and of prestige, are, therefore bending to more and more fragmentation. At the same time, the integrated nature of the problem in the rural areas and the necessities of planning require that co-ordination is constantly achieved at different levels. The only officer who can achieve this co-ordination at the District level is the District Officer. Unfortunately, we as a people seem to be incapable of achieving co-ordination without a certain degree of subordination. Our psychology seems to require that the co-ordinator is never equal, but is always higher than those whom he seeks to co-ordinate. It, therefore, seems necessary to place the District Officer in a controlling position over all other officers in his district, or to absolve him of the responsibility of co-ordination."[8]

As the joint Indo-American Team pointed out, "They become extremely competent in making decisions on broad administrative matters. Progress in technical fields of agriculture, however, requires more than ability to iron out administrative wrinkles. It requires the leadership of career professional agriculturists rather than career professional general administrators."[9]

From one extreme of decentralization, the pendulum is swinging towards the other side. The District and its Officers have become more powerful now. From giving too many powers to the "people's representatives" it has swung to restoring the District officials to their original position of prestige and power.

There was no end to corruption and mismanagement and rural tyranny in the functioning of Panchayati Raj in Andhra Pradesh. For example, the amounts given to Panchayat Samitis for purchase of good seed do not seem to have been properly spent and the amounts realized by way of selling the seed have not been accounted for fully. Between 1962 and 1966 an amount of Rs. 2,832,336, being an unspent balance on seed account alone, has not been recredited to the government. There are various other items like this which have never been accounted for. Fertilizer distribution had become a scandal.

Neither this mismanagement nor the example of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme in West Godavari District of Andhra Pradesh manifests any additional advantage in making the District Collector the head of the whole

[7] Paul H. Appleby, "*Some Thoughts on Decentralized Democracy*", Indian Journal of Public Administration, Special Number, Panchayati Raj, October–December 1962, p. 449. Rest of the articles in this Special Number go almost into rhapsodies over the ushering in of Panchayati Raj.

[8] B. P. R. Vithal, I.A.S. working paper on "The Changing Role of the District Officer". Submitted to the Conference on "The Changing Role of the District Officer," Hyderabad, December 1961, Cyclo.

[9] Report of the Joint Indo-American Team on Agricultural Research and Education, 1955, Section 344.

District Agricultural Planning Organization. The State Level Co-ordination Committee which is in charge of this one District is again headed by the First Member, Board of Revenue and the Secretaries of Agriculture, Panchayati Raj, Chief Engineer Irrigation, Directors of Agriculture, Registrar of Co-operative Societies are all members of this Committee. The Collector is squarely in charge of the programme. Yet the problems of agricultural development, the inadequacies of generalist domination over specialized services, the lack of proper co-ordination between engineering requirements and agricultural requirements have been defying solution. In these circumstances, it is doubtful how this proposal of subordinating technical men under the District Collector could be expected to work miracles. It is certain to bring to the foreground the conflict between the specialists and generalists in due course. The non-official element in its turn is again sure to blame the officials for not having provided a better service. The resolution of these conflicts will again have to depend upon the vagaries of the State political leadership.

TABLE "A"

Panchayati Raj System

Andhra Pradesh Model



TABLE "B"

System of Administrative Control
adopted by M. T. Raju Committee



Consultative and Advisory Bodies: An Aspect of Democratic Administration in East Africa

By ABRAHAM KIAPI

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THIS is a topic upon which I embark with diffidence. In the first place, I have never been part of the administration, I have not worked in the Government in any capacity; the views which follow are based on the impressions and conclusions I have come to after talking with Government officials and reading a representative selection of statutes, which I feel are relevant to this topic. I therefore ask for indulgence from readers more conversant with the administrative process.

In this paper we shall first look at how legislative measures are conceived, processed, popularized and stamped with the approval of the Cabinet and the National Assembly. And then we shall go on to discuss the various agencies which the administration utilizes in making its decisions and in implementing its policies.

The Chronology of New Legislation

The policy of a government is implemented by legislation, that is why legislation has been said to be the policy of Parliament and in interpreting legislation, Courts often claim that they are finding out the intention of the Legislature. The policy of a government cannot be implemented effectively unless it makes that policy into law, thereby making the policy applicable to and binding on all or any appropriate part of the population. The chronology of a new item of legislation may perhaps be traced from the time policy is formed.

One of the influential factors that plays a big role in the formulation of policy is public opinion. It has been said that the alteration of human institutions must, in a sense, always and everywhere depend upon the beliefs and the feelings of society. At least that is generally believed to be the position in a democratic society. The expression of public opinion has become a quick means of describing the belief or conviction prevalent in a society that a particular law is beneficial and therefore ought to be maintained or enacted or, where not considered beneficial, modified or repealed. But it must be appreciated that it is not always the case that laws are made or unmade to palliate popular demands. Governments can and in fact do take decisions to make law without consulting the public. Whether a proposed measure will become law or not always depends on the government of the day. But it remains true to say that sometimes public opinion has become public policy and been adapted into law.

In Uganda, for instance, it was the cry of the public against robbers that

persuaded the government to introduce an amendment to the Penal Code making robbery with violence a capital offence.[1] It was also mainly public opinion that influenced the Kenya Government to amend the Trade Licensing laws so that more Africans can enter into business.[2]

An opinion may originate with a single thinker; and in fact it usually comes from an individual. When this new idea presents itself to that individual, he preaches it to his friends and gradually a whole school of thought may come to accept it. It was in this manner that the Tanzanian Arusha Declaration, the Tanzanian blue-print of socialism, originated. As a guide to the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State, President Nyerere drew up what he called the National Ethic of Tanzania on which the Constitution was to be based. Among other things, he advocated socialism and state ownership of factors of production. The Arusha Declaration is in large measure the reproduction of the National Ethic. Once it was publicized, the Arusha Declaration was accepted by nearly all Tanzanians. In the words of Dicey, the Arusha Declaration soon became "a body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, accepted principles or firmly rooted prejudices"[3] which now guide the course of politics in Tanzania.

One thing we should note about public opinion in East Africa is that, if it originates from a national leader it spreads fast and soon becomes accepted. An idea initiated by a political leader can spread like wildfire. But once it is accepted by the people, it is difficult to eradicate. It is difficult to imagine what the public reaction will be if the Tanzanian Government retreats from socialism. Even a single proposal that appeared contrary to the philosophy of socialism caused a storm in the National Assembly and a resolution was passed to revoke it.[4]

Legislation may also originate from the policy of the party in power. Each party has its own manifesto: its aims and objectives, its programme, should it come into power. This manifesto therefore is a very important source of policy. The whole programme of the party is expected to be the fulfilment of its promises to the people made in the manifesto.

Many points of policy may be initiated by civil servants. They know intimately the working of the various laws administered by the departments. They are therefore in a position to point out what changes or modifications are desirable in the light of their own knowledge and experience, since they are in the best position to appraise the working of the legislation they have been empowered to administer. Civil servants in this respect play a very important role in policy formulation. But it must be borne in mind that they only recommend to the Minister the changes or additions or modifications necessary. It is for the Minister or the Cabinet to decide whether or not to accept the advice that is tendered. It is usually accepted that Ministers seldom throw out *in toto* the suggestions of their civil servants.

These then are the three principal ways in which the policy ball may start to roll: the wave of public opinion, party policies and departmental recommendations. But once a policy is to become law, it must be accepted by at

[1] *Penal Code (Amendment) Act*, 1968 (Act 12 of 1968).
[2] *Trade Licensing Act*, 1967 (Act 33 of 1967).
[3] Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England*, pp. 17–47.
[4] An attempt by the Government of Tanzania to give 10% gratuity to certain office holders on relinquishing office was rejected by the National Assembly.

least a ministry or a department. It is essential that a Minister assumes responsibility for the implementation of the policy by a legislative measure. Once a policy has been accepted by a ministry or department, the Minister next seeks the approval of the Cabinet to the principles of the proposed legislation. The usual practice appears to be that a departmental official writes a memorandum to the members of the Cabinet outlining the purposes of the proposed measure, how it will be implemented, how much it will cost and how it fits in with the legislative programme of the government. In most cases it is desirable to send a copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General's Chambers to see if no legislation already on the statute book can adequately deal with the proposed measure. It can sometimes happen that an Act of Parliament is not necessary for carrying out the policy. The Cabinet might also expect to be advised on the priority of the measure so that an appropriate time is fixed for its consideration in a Cabinet meeting.

Once the Cabinet has given its approval in principle, the department is notified accordingly. It is at this time that a departmental official prepares a drafting instruction to the Parliamentary Draftsman. This is a very important instruction.

The memorandum to the Parliamentary Draftsman must be thorough, setting out clearly the policy behind the proposed legislation, what is sought to be achieved, the machinery needed to implement the proposed law, the technique of enforcement, and other related matters. A lawyer cannot put a proposal into legal language unless he is fully instructed and so able to determine the extent to which other legislation may require modification, amendment or repeal.

On the receipt of his instructions, the Draftsman reads them and forms his first impression of how the statute will take shape. If he does not have sufficient information, he usually asks for further clarification from the department concerned. The Draftsman is also expected to look through all the existing laws and determine if the bill is really necessary and what statutes will have to be amended. After agreement on its form between the Draftsman and the Ministry involved, the first draft of the bill is sent to the Government Printer for printing.

The draft bill is now laid before the Cabinet. If the Cabinet approves of it, it is circulated among the members of Parliament. In Uganda and Kenya, it is usual for the Parliamentary Groups to discuss the bill before debating it on the floor of the House. Bills to be introduced to the National Assembly are usually prefaced by a memorandum explaining its objects. It is only after Cabinet approval that the bill is published in the Official Gazette as a supplement.

Consultation

Once a policy has been agreed upon in principle, the Minister consults those who are likely to be affected by the implementation of the policy. Consultation is a very useful aid in arriving at decisions.

Those consulted first are normally Government departments whose interests and programmes may be affected by the proposed measure. Government works as a unit. A decision taken by one Ministry affects the interests of several others. All those others must be consulted so that the activities of the

government are co-ordinated. For instance, if the Ministry of Education would like to build a secondary school, it must enlist the support of the Treasury because they need money for the project; the Ministry of Works must be asked because they are expected to build the school houses or at least to arrange tenders for them; the Ministry of Lands must advise on the availability of the site; the Ministry of Health must advise on the possible health hazards that can be anticipated. Inter-departmental consultation is therefore very essential if a programme is to achieve its target satisfactorily.

Law making is a skill that needs expertise. Those who process policies and make them into law must know the substance of the proposed law, and be able to formulate it with a minimum of vagueness. The knowledge required for the enactment of a statute or delegated legislation is very complex. Those who are responsible for promoting a new law may not be aware that existing legal and administrative institutions can be used to achieve the desired result. They may not even know how far existing rights may be affected by the proposals. Suppose the Ministry of Home Affairs would like to reduce the number of motor car accidents on the roads, the following questions must be answered:

(a) What are the causes of the accidents?
(b) Why are the existing traffic regulations inadequate?
(c) What new measure can best be introduced?
(d) How will the new measure affect the existing law and rights of the public?
(e) What machinery is best suited to carry out the new measure?
(f) How much more money will the Ministry need to carry out the proposals?

These are just a few of the most important questions that must be answered before a new sound, needed law can be added to the statute book. The creation of good law therefore involves the following essential factors:

(i) Technical knowledge of the subject matter;
(ii) An understanding of the existing law;
(iii) An ability to make sound estimates of the finance required, and the administrative efforts, procedures, and machinery required to implement the proposed new legislation;
(iv) A sympathetic appreciation of any general disturbance likely to be caused.[5]

No single individual can answer all these questions. The co-operation of a number of technically competent authorities is essential. The department cannot go it alone. It must seek assistance from elsewhere. One of the methods for obtaining information about technical matters and the feelings of those who will be affected is consultation with those who are outside the government.

Where the economic control of private business enterprise is the purpose of regulation, which means bringing the enterprise under public control and at the same time leaving its management in private hands, then before the measure is finally decided upon, there is need to undertake formal consultation with those who will be affected. In fact, in East Africa, in most cases, statutes give the owners a right to be heard when regulations or orders are promul-

[5] Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Governments*, p. 445.

gated in respect of their businesses. Consultation brings them closer to the regulating government department. Where the administration of control and assistance in relation to an industry has been entrusted to statutory boards, usually consisting of the private sector interests concerned and representatives of government departments, the Minister is required to consult the Board before making regulations in respect of the industry. The composition of these boards ensures that some opportunity is afforded to the interests affected to express their views and to make suggestions before they are bound by administrative measures.

Let us take for instance the control of the pyrethrum industry in Kenya. The Pyrethrum Act, 1964, establishes among other things, a Pyrethrum Board. The functions of the Board are said to be (a) to license pyrethrum growers; (b) to investigate and do research into all matters connected with the agronomy of pyrethrum; and (c) to negotiate the transfer of research functions to an East African institution.[6] The Minister of Agriculture is empowered to make rules generally for the better carrying out of the purposes and provisions of the Pyrethrum Act. But this is subject to the requirement that he must consult the Board before making the rules. This ensures that the interested parties will have their views taken into account before any change is made in the *status quo*.[7] The pyrethrum growers are sufficiently represented on the Board as it consists, *inter alios*, of (i) not more than eight persons, appointed by the Minister from panels of names submitted by pyrethrum growers under arrangements made by the Minister, being persons who, in his opinion, are representative of the main pyrethrum producing regions of Kenya, and (ii) four members appointed by the Minister, who in his opinion possess qualities likely to be of benefit to the Board.[8]

Besides those who must be consulted on account of their interest in the proposed measures, another category of persons consulted are experts in particular fields who can intelligently tender advice on the contemplated course of action. If a measure concerns traffic, the Automobile Association may be consulted; if it concerns health or drugs, the medical profession; wages, the appropriate trade union, etc. The practice has also grown whereby the Minister may appoint an advisory body under statutory authority to advise a department on various aspects of departmental programmes. There are quite a few examples of such a body.

In January, 1964, the Uganda Minister of Community Development and Labour appointed an advisory committee on social welfare to advise him on matters relating to social welfare. The Secretary of the committee was *ex officio* the Principal Welfare Officer.[9] In the same year in Uganda the Minister of Works appointed an Aerodromes Advisory Committee, consisting among others of the Inspector-General of Police, the Director of Civil Aviation, the Manager of the Uganda Office of the East African Airways Corporation and representatives of overseas airways. The terms of reference of the committee were to make recommendations to the Government on both general and detailed policies for aerodrome development in Uganda; to keep

[6] *Section* 6(2).
[7] *Section* 36(1).
[8] *Section* 4(1).
[9] See *Uganda Gazette, General Notice* 26 *of* 1964.

under constant review the aerodrome needs of Uganda; to advise the Minister of Works on the standard of aerodrome services to be adopted. The committee may also advise on any suggestions concerning aerodromes made to the Government by users and operators of air services.[10]

Several statutes provide for the setting up of advisory bodies to assist the Government. It is usually made obligatory for the responsible Minister to consult this body before acting or making a decision on certain specified matters. The composition of the body is either laid down in the parent Act or left to be regulated by rules or orders to be made by the Minister. Sometimes the Minister is given full discretion to constitute such a body and to determine its membership. Sometimes the statute lays down the composition of the body, or at least the class of persons eligible to become members. There is authority for the view that where the Minister is empowered to constitute these bodies and to consult them before adapting certain measures, he *must* consult before taking appropriate action.[11] Where the Minister is, by statute, required to consult an advisory body then he must, at the least, supply that body with sufficient information to enable it to tender the advice he is seeking and sufficient opportunity to consider the matter with due care. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Minister is not bound to follow the advice. The decision is his. All he is expected to do is to seek the views of those he is required to consult and take the views into consideration in arriving at a decision.

Let us look at some examples of these advisory bodies. Under the Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils Act of Uganda, the Minister for Labour is empowered to appoint minimum wages advisory boards for any special area or for any employees or groups of employees in any occupation in which he considers that it is desirable to fix a minimum wage and to determine conditions of employment. The Board is required to inquire into the wages and conditions of service of the employees coming within their terms of reference.[12] The Board consists of three persons appointed by the Minister, and at the same time the Minister is given discretion to appoint not more than two representatives each of employers and employees directly connected with the area or occupation which falls within the Board's terms of reference. But before appointing such representatives the Minister is required to consult any organisations appearing to him to represent employers or employees connected with the occupational field concerned.[13] The Board has statutory powers to enforce attendance of witnesses and it is an offence to be in contempt of the Board.[14]

The Board has power to recommend minimum wages to be paid to employees and other conditions of employment in respect of those particular employees, including holidays, wages for overtime, and the remuneration of apprentices.[15] The Minister may approve the proposals or send them back to the Board for reconsideration. If the Minister approves the proposals, he publishes them and invites representations from the public. After hearing

10 *Uganda Gazette, General Notice* 277 *of* 1964.
11 *May v. Beattie* (1927) 2*K.B. at* p. 363.
12 *Section* 3.
13 *Schedule One.*
14 *Section* 4.
15 *Section* 5.

any such representations, and, if he so chooses, after inviting the Board to comment on them, then thirty days after their publication the Minister sends the proposals to the President together with a copy of any representations thereon he has received. The President may accept the proposals or vary them as he thinks fit and his ruling is then published as an order in the Gazette.[16]

The same statute also empowers the Minister to establish wages councils where he thinks no adequate machinery exists for fixing wages and other conditions of work in a particular area or with respect to particular employees or occupations. The council consists of not less than five persons including representatives of employees and employers. As with the wages board, the wages council has power to recommend wages and other conditions of employment falling within its terms of reference. Before the Minister makes a wages order he is required to publish his intentions and to invite the public to inspect the draft order and to make objections thereto if they wish. If no objections are lodged within the required time, or if the Minister, after considering all objections duly submitted, is of the opinion that the objections are not such as to warrant any modification, he may then promulgate the order. The lodging of objections ensures that those whose interests are likely to be adversely affected by a recommendation of the council are heard before the final decision is taken by the Minister. A further safeguard is provided by the statutory procedure of the council in its investigations. Though it is given full discretion to make investigations as it thinks fit, the council is required to publish its intention to submit proposals to the Minister, stating where its draft proposals can be obtained and to invite written representations from those who wish to make objections. The council is required to consider representations made to it and to make further enquiries in the light of any objections before submitting its proposals to the Minister. Once submitted to him, the Minister may reject or accept the proposals. Where the Minister makes a wages regulation order, he is required to have the terms published so that all persons who will be affected by the order can be informed.

Regulation of Water Rights in Tanzania

The history of the attempts to regulate water rights in Tanzania given by the then Minister of Natural Resources also throws light on the use the Government makes of advisory bodies.[17] Because the earlier statutes were not working satisfactorily the Governor appointed a committee to make recommendations on the adequate control of the attraction and use of water and to advise if amendments to the existing law were necessary. The committee, as expected, recommended a change in the Ordinance and a Bill was drafted on the basis of the recommendations.

Under the present law, a board is appointed in each water region to advise the water officer on the allocation of water rights. If there is an appeal from the decisions of the water officer, the Minister hears the appeal and to arrive at his decision fairly he appoints an advisory committee to help him in his consideration of the appeal. But he is not bound to accept the advice of the committee. We should also note that interested parties can object to an

[16] *Section 6.*
[17] See *Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates*, 34th Session, Vol. I, pp. 115–121.

application for a water right and the water officer is required to serve a copy of every application on all those who might be affected thereby. All objectors are entitled to be heard before a final decision is made.

Our two case studies in the regulation of wages and water rights reveal several important facts. The first is that the government makes every possible attempt to take into consideration the views of those who are likely to be affected before arriving at a decision. Secondly the Minister is not bound to act in accordance with the advice tendered to him. This is because the decisions must be governed by public policy and the claims of individuals should not bind the government. The Minister is the one responsible for the formulation of policy. He is answerable for it in Parliament. Therefore, he cannot fetter his discretion by abdicating his duties to a board.

When an advisory body is set up by a statute or by a government authority under a statute, and when the law requires the government authority to consult the body before reaching a decision on certain specified matters, then any such decision reached will be *ultra vires* and void for defects of procedure unless the following requirements are satisfied: the advisory body must in fact be consulted; that is, it must be given full information about the decision contemplated and asked its views about the proposals; it must be given sufficient time to consider the matter, and the decision must be arrived at after considering the views expressed. In other words consultation must be genuine and businesslike.

The common form of procedure for these consultations is that the department sends the draft of the proposals to the bodies to be consulted. This is just to inform them that the government would like to do this and that, or to decide this and that matter, and invite their views on the subject. Usually a time limit is stipulated within which views are to be expressed. When the time has elapsed the observations received are considered in the light of the advice of the technical experts of the department. The government may or may not modify its views to tally with the opinions of the persons so consulted. Where a radical modification is made, the draft proposals may be sent back to the advisory body for further comments.

Besides this formal method of consultation, interested groups or individuals may seek to meet the Minister or his representatives about the proposals. Whether this request will be granted will depend on the status of the organization or group and the importance of the matter at issue, as well as the political implications of implementing the proposals. For example when proposals were made in Uganda and Kenya to bring missionary schools under closer government control, the Ministers of Education agreed to meet Bishops and Priests of various denominations to discuss the possible religious repercussions of secularizing the schools. It therefore follows that groups that are organized have a better chance of being heard than diverse individuals. For groups can be consulted more easily. We need not emphasize that group organization is very essential in consultative procedures. Organized groups can easily participate in official action. The individual has no legal right to be heard before government takes action and he therefore has little or no influence if he is not organized.

In conclusion we may say that consultation with statutory advisory boards and other interested groups plays a very important role in the administrative

process: (a) by seeking the advice of outside experts the Government can avoid making serious errors. Mistakes with respect to interested parties can be avoided; (b) the Government is also able to know well in advance the possible reaction amongst the people on a proposed law or course of action; (c) the process of consultation also promotes good public relations between the people and the government. The people are made to feel that the government is at least democratic and that it consults them before taking action. This wins their goodwill and their co-operation later in carrying out government plans. Some measures cannot be carried out satisfactorily unless the co-operation of those closely affected is first enlisted. That is why governments are at pains to consult interested parties before regulating the economic activities of the private sector. Consultation therefore is beneficial both to the administration and to the public as a whole.

The Nature of Advisory Bodies

Advisory bodies are now an institution, they are as much part of the administrative machinery as the civil service itself. An understanding of their nature and functions is essential to the administrative lawyer. Moreover, these advisory bodies have been set up, in some instances, as a safeguard against abuse of power by the executive. They have been established to ensure that the administration balances "public interest which it promotes with individual interest which it disturbs."

Advisory Boards are usually appointed to work in conjunction with individual government departments. They are adjuncts of the administration, but they vary considerably in function and composition. The members of Boards are normally appointed by the responsible Minister; and they are required to be individuals who are qualified by knowledge and experience to give practical, useful advice on a particular subject. They usually include experts on the particular matter to be investigated. It is also usual to include members drawn from the interests that are relevant to the work of the board. This is to ensure that a decision arrived at does not interfere unduly with their just rights; and moreover, they are often in the best position to advise the Minister on the facts of the situation in the field in which they are the most closely concerned of all. It may also be useful to include some members representing the more practical shades of opinion. They bring the views of the common man to bear upon official action. It invariably happens that officials of a department sit upon these boards. It is also usual for an official of the department to act as secretary. For instance, as we have seen, when the Uganda Minister of Community Development appointed an Advisory Committee on Social Welfare in 1964, the Secretary of the Committee was the Principal Welfare Officer.

In establishing a committee the administrator must bear in mind certain important facets. If the committee is too big, it is likely to be ineffective, unless it breaks up into sub-committees. A large committee will become too bulky to function properly. It is therefore suggested that advisory committees should be small in their membership so that they can deliberate quickly and effectively. It is also good administrative technique to choose competent persons who will really devote their time to the tasks of the committee. If certain individuals are appointed merely because of their status in society,

their contribution to the work of the committee will be negligible. Some of those so-called important persons are so occupied with certain aspects of life that they are completely out of touch with the day to day affairs of the common man or the organization they purport to represent. The best advice is most of the time obtained from persons with less apparent eminence who master fully one branch of knowledge.

The nature of these advisory bodies varies. Some are appointed as adjuncts of the administration and form part of the machinery of government. They are institutionalized and remain a permanent feature of the particular department. For instance, the Senior Staff Advisory Council established by the President of Tanzania in 1963 is a permanent feature of the civil service scene; the Water Boards appointed by the Minister in Tanzania to advise water officers in the management of water rights and distribution are also permanent.[18]

Some of the boards we have in East Africa are appointed for a definite and limited purpose, to investigate and recommend on the solution of a particular problem. They die together with their report and findings. A good example is the Uganda Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Minimum Wages Advisory Councils which the Minister for Labour is empowered to appoint from time to time to advise on fixing wages and other conditions of work for specified employees and areas.[19]

There are other boards also which not only advise but also manage and regulate an industry or some other aspect of the economic life of the people. For instance, the Kenya Pyrethrum Board not only licenses pyrethrum growers but also acts in a consultative capacity to the Minister in formulating further administrative or technical policies for the pyrethrum industry. Suitably composed they are admirably fitted to discharge these dual functions.

Advisory bodies may be consulted at any stage of the process of government. They play a role in the formulation of policy; in the administration and application of policy; and even in the review of policy. It can easily be seen that departments with scientific matters to deal with, have more advisory committees than others. We have already given the example of the control of water rights, wages, and pyrethrum growing and marketing. These by no means close the list. In fact most regulatory and marketing agencies act in an advisory capacity to the government in addition to their primary function. A look at the functions of the lint marketing boards, the coffee marketing boards and other agricultural products boards will make this clear.

It is also seen that where services are conducted by local and central government in partnership, advisory bodies have also been established. The Planning Commission of Kenya, for instance, consists of representatives of local authorities and the central government. This ensures that the inter-

[18] Other good examples are the Advisory Panel established by section 15, the Uganda Historical Monuments Act, 1967; the Social Security Advisory Council, set up by section 21 of the Uganda Social Security Act; the Advisory Council set up by the Kenya Education Act.

[19] Other examples of *ad hoc* advisory committees are the Appeals Advisory Committee set up by Tanzanian Ministers to advise them on appeals from decisions of regulatory agencies such as the Transport Licensing Authority, Water Officers, etc.

ests of rural and urban areas are taken into account in framing development policies.[20]

The boards are usually required to inquire into the matter on which they are to tender advice. They are expected to make full investigation, and for this purpose, they may be empowered to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to enlist the help of experts to advise them on specific matters.[21] The boards submit their recommendations to the Minister who appointed them. It is important to emphasize that what a board does and can do depends on the statute under which it has been set up. But in general the procedure differs very little.

The Role of Advisory Bodies in the Administrative Process

From the very nature of their composition and their functions these advisory bodies can bring changes in administrative techniques and attitudes. They are a source of expert knowledge on technical matters because they are able to do research and collect information which civil servants may not be able to do, for want of time. We can now summarize briefly the role played by these advisory bodies in the administrative process:

(1) through these bodies the government is able to obtain quickly and in advance, the reaction of the various sections of the public on what it proposes to do;

(2) by the use of advisory bodies the government can tap the practical experience and expert knowledge which are essential to making governmental regulation of complex affairs practicable;

(3) by consultation and discussion the government can explain to the representatives of the various groups what ends it is seeking to achieve;

(4) advisory bodies maintain liaison between the government and the interests represented thereon. The secretary of these bodies being usually a public officer, can help to explain government policies and he acts as the government's public relations officer in reaching difficult decisions with vested interests.

The usefulness of an advisory body however depends on several factors. When a department establishes an advisory body because it feels the need for obtaining information either from experts or from interested parties, then it can be well worthwhile. Through the advisory body the government obtains knowledge not available in the department. But if the advisory body is established to placate public opinion or to give an impression that consultation is occurring, or to keep the experts or the interested parties happy, the value of an advisory body may be very doubtful. Political considerations may require the setting up of an advisory body whose usefulness to the department may be seriously in doubt. Since the Minister may or may not follow the advice of the body, its work may have counted for nothing. The whole exercise can be a waste of time. And moreover, as the advice tendered is confidential till the Minister decides to publish it, the public have no way of knowing what advice has been tendered. It is also possible for the government to use the

[20] *Kenya Development Plan* 1964–70, p. 8.
[21] For instance, the Tanzania Senior Staff Advisory Council set up in 1963.

camouflage of an advisory committee to block a debate in the National Assembly; we saw this occur when the then Minister of Natural Resources in the Tanganyika Government was introducing the Water Bill, in 1958. He was using the argument that the government had all along been advised by a committee to change the law regulating water rights in order to persuade the members of the Legislative Council to support the bill.[22] By saying that the interested parties have already been consulted or that the government is acting in accordance with expert advice, Parliament may be invited merely to rubber-stamp government proposals.

Whatever the attitude of a Minister may be to advice tendered by these bodies, it is submitted that since the Minister cannot possibly be an efficient administrator unless his department avails itself of the advice and assistance of the various sections of the community, such advice always will have impact on the final decisions taken. Though the responsibility for making the decision is the Minister's, his discretion will be fettered by the moral obligation sympathetically to consider advice his officials have so laboriously sought. Why should a body be asked for its expert advice if its views are not going to be adapted anyway? Moreover Parliament can always seek justification for rejecting advice tendered by bodies which Parliament itself thought important to establish. This sanction is particularly important when the Minister is required to lay before Parliament an order he makes after consulting specified statutory bodies together with their own recommendations, views or comments.

[22] *Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates*, 34th Session, Vol. I, pp. 115–121.

Quarterly Notes

BRITAIN—THE CRISIS IN PLANNING CONFERENCE

Organized by the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 29th June – 12th July 1969.

(A note contributed by M. L. O. Faber)

The twenty or so papers (all, praise be, circulated well in advance) were divided about equally between descriptions of planning procedures and experience (in Africa, India, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the UK), and particular aspects of planning (methodology, the use of models, incomes policy, sector planning, the role of the UN, foreign advisers). The hundred or so participants (all by invitation) were about equally divided between those from "developed" and those from "developing" countries; or, cutting the cast another way, between academics and practitioners, though this last distinction is somewhat artificial. After all, planning is one of those subjects where dons have an opportunity to practise what they teach.

"What is happening is that planning is being thought of in terms that, apparently, require the world to be other than it is if planning is to 'work'."

The economists were in the majority; but the rest were in a mood to go on the offensive. Had not the promise of planning withered? And the promises of planners been repeatedly falsified? Political scientists, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, work-a-day administrators, and one solitary (but very unabashed) businessman – all had it in for the economists for having monopolized planning, for having over-sold it to the politicians, and for having neglected those aspects of change which they themselves were most concerned with. The quotation at the start of the paragraph came from Colin Leys. There were other criticisms in the same vein, many justified and some constructive, and made more enjoyable by the tone of "Take that, for being so arrogant" that occasionally crept in.

The economists themselves were in a mood for self-criticism – or at least in the mood for criticizing each other, which may not amount to quite the same thing. Dudley Seers laid – or perhaps that should read "led" – the charge with a paper entitled "The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", which provoked Lord Balogh to murmur "I detect an interesting conjugation here ... 'I plan, you pseudo-plan, he doesn't plan at all'." The Conference's main concern emerged, predictably but usefully, not with abandoning planning, but with making its techniques more relevant and their application more effective, and with improving the training of future planners.

It was argued that far too much attention had been paid to the preparation of medium-term (i.e. 5-Year) plans, to the neglect of longer-term planning, short-term budgeting, the political, administrative and social realities, and the implementation of anything. Albert Waterston, in particular, urged that more emphasis should be placed upon annual budgeting, sector planning, and what might be described as a project-by-project approach. This view won considerable support from "non-economists" who thought it the most

practical approach given the conditions in most less developed countries. But it stimulated resistance from many economists, indeed most of those present, who believe that their subject is still primarily concerned with optimization.

"With the hindsight of experience, I can state unequivocally that planning is an enormous help to the politician."

Perhaps that is why, more likely than not, it will continue. The earlier quotation came from a paper by a political scientist. This one came from a politician, and no less a politician at that than Dr. Eric Williams, both a Prime Minister *and* a Minister of Planning, who must surely approach the model of a planner's philosopher-king. But Trinidad's degree of success with planning has been unusual, and not everyone entertained quite such a cosy view of the partnership between politician and planner. Later on, almost as a postscript, the Conference received a cri-de-coeur from an African civil servant, formerly Secretary to his Cabinet, who seemed to regard "the Plan" as a form of conspiracy between politicians and planners to place impossible tasks before the administration, which the administration would later be blamed for not performing.

In the Institute's Bulletin, available at the Conference, Dudley Seers ruminates "It is not easy to organize a conference so that it is attended by those with most to contribute, and still harder to set up the discussions in such a way that the full potential contribution of the participants (which is often massive) is extracted." The Sussex experience suggests two further reflections. First, that the more successfully the first part of the task is achieved, the more impossible the latter task becomes. Second, that the wider the subject of the conference, the less penetrating and authoritative are likely to be its conclusions – indeed it may be misleading to expect conclusions at all. This latter reflection is prompted by thought that the book which will result from the recent Conference is certain to contain many extremely interesting papers and interventions. But it is unlikely to be as incisive as "The Crisis in Indian Planning",[1] which emerged from an earlier Sussex conference.

Was the Conference a success then? Almost all who attended would, I think, have said "yes". After all, as the Bulletin observed, conferences have many functions – some manifest, others latent. This one was admirably organized. The setting and the weather were splendid. The papers were almost all worth reading, and the discussions from the floor worth listening to. People met each other. Knowledge and goodwill were generated. Those who administer and those who teach alike left with things to ponder over.

UNITED NATIONS – *Urbanization Policy*

While inordinate urban growth and accelerating urbanization pose serious social and economic problems which merit continuing attention and remedial action, the crucial need is to develop national urban policies conducive to economic, social and political development.

The key challenge is that posed, on the one hand, by the swelling stream of migration from rural areas and small towns to one or a few larger (in particular metropolitan) urban centres and, on the other, by the enormous lag in

[1] Oxford University Press, 1968, price 75/-

housing, public services and facilities and employment opportunities. Linked to these basic factors are all major urban problems of the developing world: overcrowding, poor standards of education, sanitation, and health, as well as social and individual disorganization. Of course, these problems are not derived from urbanization and urban growth *per se*, nor even from their present magnitude, but from the uncontrolled way in which these processes occur in the economically less developed countries. Urban problems in the less developed regions are part and parcel of the problem of under-development. Awareness of their seriousness should lead to a policy which seeks to guide urbanization in the ways most favourable to over-all development, rather than to measures which represent an anti-urbanization attitude.

The urbanization processes in the less developed regions today have often been recognized as largely irreversible in character. Attempts to slow down rural-urban migration or to keep the population on the land, are generally seen as unpromising. The real problem is the distorted nature of urbanization in the developing countries, both in terms of over-concentration of the urban population in a few larger primate centres, and in terms of the internal unintegrated physical, economic, social and cultural characteristics of these centres. Action, therefore, is required to re-direct the migratory currents, build up alternative growth-poles, implement physical, economic and social plans in the existing cities to make them a more favourable environment for development. Attempts to reverse or delay the urbanization process will only result in scattering meagre resources and achieve too little all-round rural improvement to make any effective impact on the trends of population redistribution.

The ideal urbanization policy depends, of course, on the specific conditions of each country, and especially on the degree and character of existing urban growth and the stage of industrial development. Urban centres have had and still have an important role in initiating the development process. City growth in a pre-industrial society is often related to the country's role as a producer of primary commodities for the international market or the establishment of modern "enclaves" in an otherwise traditional and non-monetary social and economic setting. Such cities offer the most fertile *milieu* (economically – by providing a market for industrial goods, labour, services, and financial and commercial institutions – as well as socially, culturally and politically) for industrial development when conditions become favourable for import-substitution. From this perspective, it may be that in some countries urbanization has not yet produced centres large enough (unwieldy and serious as the associated urban problems already appear to be) to provide the economic and social advantages necessary for industrial development. In these cases policies are required to create at least one viable urban centre with the necessary infra-structure and institutions.

Industrialization elsewhere, having started in the larger urban centres, tends to proceed, by the workings of a complex of economic, social and political forces, with ever increasing concentration in the same general area. Other regions of the country not only fail to develop, but often undergo a process of regression, because of the effect of the more advanced region (or regions) upon their own rural and urban economics. Commonly, however, urbanization continues, becoming more and more divorced from economic

development in the backward areas. In these circumstances, a policy for reversing urban and industrial concentration – pursued by means of co-ordinated economic, social and physical programmes – is not only consistent with national development goals, but essential. A policy of urbanization, however, covering the locational aspect of investment (both economic and social) which is most conducive to continuing overall development, is that of "selective concentration" in a few areas with high development potential, rather than that of "dispersion."

Source: *Ekistics*, Volume 27, Number 161, April 1969.

NEW ZEALAND – *New Local Government area schemes*

After nearly a year of work, the commission set up under the Local Government Commission Act has drawn up a loose timetable and format for the presentation of its area schemes. Its success or otherwise in Wellington will largely determine the commission's proposals for other areas.

First step is likely to be a meeting of all mayors, country chairmen, town clerks and engineers in Wellington at which the proposed scheme will be announced. This meeting will be a private one, and the proposed scheme will remain confidential.

Ten or twelve days later the commission will then call on the board, council or executive committee of all the local bodies affected and discuss the plan. It will listen to and take into account objections, suggestions and new theories.

On publication of the provisional scheme, a three-month period will be allowed for the lodging of objections. These will then be heard informally, and probably in public, by the commission. The commission will take into account these objections in the preparation of its final scheme, which is subject only to appeal on the grounds of law.

Once the final scheme is promulgated, the initiative for its fulfilment will lie either with the commission, the minister, the local bodies affected, or the ratepayers. If sufficient number of ratepayers request it, normal provisions for a poll will apply; but the commission hopes that local bodies themselves will take the initiative in reorganization and that intervention by the commission or the minister or ratepayers will not be necessary.

Throughout all its dealings so far, the commission has stressed the need for informality. It believes that formal hearings are costly, time-consuming and often achieve nothing. For this reason, the commission has endeavoured in its twelve months in operation to meet as many local body administrators as possible. The commission has also travelled extensively in the Auckland area in the preparation of a regional scheme and has met most of the territorial and *ad hoc* bodies likely to be affected.

Behind the scenes, the Lands and Survey Department has prepared an extensive series of maps showing local body boundaries throughout New Zealand. These have been prepared on the basis of one for each area in which a scheme appears feasible with overlaps into adjoining areas. The commission has then called for more detailed maps within each of these dozen or so main areas. It has drawn extensively on the services of other government departments for projections on population growth, likely industrial development, geographical and topographical data and any other information likely to affect the preparation of overall area schemes.

Every effort has been made to seek projections of local body needs fifteen to twenty years ahead and even up to the year 2000. For this reason, the commission hopes that its schemes will cater for likely urban growth for at least the next ten years and possibly the next twenty.

In addition to this work the commission has been involved in the preparation of boundary plans for the eleven or twelve water authorities which will cover most of New Zealand under the umbrella of the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority. It has also been called upon to conduct public hearings on local schemes in the Auckland area and to consider local schemes put forward from various areas. In some cases suggestions for local schemes have been deferred because of the possibility that they might conflict with the preparation of a future area scheme.

Meanwhile various local authorities have taken the initiative on reorganization. Meetings have been held among counties in the Manawatu area, Thames/Coromandel areas and South Canterbury.

According to the Act, the commission is required to work to a loose deadline of 31 December 1972, although there is provision for an unlimited extension beyond that date. So far there is no indication whether or not the commission will fulfil its task of formulating local schemes for every part of New Zealand by the desired date.

The commission, however, points out that the two areas it has tackled initially are likely to be the two most difficult areas in New Zealand and that a good deal of time since its appointment has been taken up with the routine task of formulating procedure. Having gained experience from the Auckland and Wellington areas, the procedure is likely to be speeded up considerably, particularly in view of the desire in some areas for local bodies to initiate reorganization talks without the prompting of the commission.

Extract from *New Zealand Local Government*, May 1969.

BRITAIN – *Ombudsman for Local Government*

The Government intend to set up an Ombudsman system for investigating complaints of maladministration by local government.

Announcing this at Question Time in the Commons on 22nd July, the Prime Minister said that the Government accepted in principle the setting up by law of such a system. The activities of local authorities impinged upon the daily life of the citizens directly and over a wide range, and the introduction of a system analogous to that of the Parliamentary Commissioner into the local government sphere would be a major extension of the citizen's right to seek redress.

Mr. Wilson continued: "We envisage that a local ombudsman system would be separate from the Parliamentary Commissioner system; that its scope in relation to local government affairs would be similar to the scope of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in central Government affairs: and that the independent reports would be considered by the appropriate local authority. The Government will, therefore, enter into discussions with the local authority Associations and other bodies concerned with a view to introducing the necessary legislation; and will then present detailed proposals in the context of local government reorganisation."

Extract: *County Councils Gazette*, August 1969.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC – *Training for Development*

One of the major activities of the Arab States Training Centre for Education for Community Development (ASFEC), which has been established in Cairo, is to train certain categories of persons engaged in the processes of economic, social, and cultural development, with emphasis on the community development approach.

The trainees are selected from among administrators and supervisors of projects at national or community development level, specialists in community development projects, and trainers at the national level responsible for training at the local levels.

The Public Administration and Local Government Programme aims at stimulating awareness and interest in public administration as a vital part of community development programmes, spreading knowledge of public administration principles and techniques to enable students to perform administrative tasks in Arab countries, and familiarizing trainees with public administration and local government literature.

The public administration programme includes: organization and administration of local institutions, their functions and objectives; how duties, responsibilities and authority are defined; systems of control and supervision; relations between various institutions and agencies at central, local, and regional levels; the role of local institutions in the processes of planning, execution, follow-up and evaluation of programmes and projects; appraisal of administrative efficiency of various institutions; and analysis of administrative problems and methods for solving them. Trainees are also helped to recognize: the need for integrating local efforts with regional and national plans and projects for improving local conditions; the value of each of the public administration elements – planning, organization, personnel, supervision, co-ordination, financing, control, public relations, etc. – in relation to community development programmes; the relationship between administrative leadership and technical and popular leadership in local community development.

The programme in local government includes: national planning and development; increasing community participation in the administration of services; training and development of local leaders; maintenance of voluntary initial efforts, increasing productive output and individual income; increasing community services; and the creation of a spirit of community self-help, initiative and leadership. The programme also deals with the relations between local government and land reform and co-operative organizations, as well as the co-ordinating role of local councils in implementing community development programmes and projects.

Source: *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXIII – 1967, No. 4.

BRITAIN – *Social Planning – A Ministry of Overseas Development Initiative in Co-operation with the Institute of Development Studies, at the University of Sussex.*

Whilst preparations go on apace for the next development decade, international criticism directed at the methods and targets of the last development decade gain in intensity. In international circles the disenchantment with

economic planning (even the Institute of Development Studies, in June of this year, held a conference on The Crisis in Planning) has been offset to a minor extent with a new enthusiasm for social planning.

Whilst a clear definition of social planning has yet to be achieved, there is no dearth of supporters for this new concept. The United Nations itself has appointed experts in social planning, there is a small but steady demand from developing countries for social planners, and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, is organizing courses in social planning.

In the development field fashions come and go, but it does appear that social planning is beginning to attain the fashion popularity of the mini-skirt and, unlike the mini-skirt, is probably here to stay for a while.

The Ministry of Overseas Development decided that the publication of a paper on the British attitude to social planning would be timely at this juncture and thought it advisable that the paper should come from the Institute of Development Studies and that the I.D.S. should organize a study in this field.

In due course the matter of social planning was taken up with Professor Dudley Seers, the Director of the Institute, Professor Leonard Joy, the Deputy Director of the Institute, Professor C. T. Leys and Dr. B. S. Schroffer. There was general agreement that the I.D.S. should convene a conference for the purpose of examining social planning and publishing a paper on the British attitude towards social planning. For this purpose it was agreed that a small conference would be convened at the I.D.S. and those invited would be persons who had something to contribute to present thinking on social planning and could make a positive contribution towards the development of a published paper. It was agreed that in no sense of the word should the Conference be a teaching conference but it would be structured on a series of planned discussions centred on prepared papers.

Professor Raymond Apthorpe, one time Director of the East African Institute of Social Research, and at this time employed at the I.D.S., was given the responsibility of organizing and structuring the Conference and eliciting prepared papers from known academic experts in the field of social development. In answer to Professor Apthorpe's invitation some 37 people attended, including staff from the I.D.S. and the O.D.M. The United Nations was represented by Dr. D. V. McGranahan, Head of the U.N. Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, and Mr. Peter Kuensler, a representative of the Division of Social Affairs, United Nations, Geneva.

The Conference took place from the 16th to the 18th April 1969, at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. In terms of organization the Conference was focused on groups of topic papers. The authors of the topic papers concerned each gave a brief introduction, including a specific point of view, and then discussion ensued.

In addition to topic papers and plenary discussions the Conference divided itself up into some ten groups, each one concerned with a particular aspect of social planning, as listed below:

(1) Problems of transfer;
(2) Goals and benefits distribution;
(3) Minimum standards or equality;
(4) Cross sectoral strategies;

(5) Responsibility;
(6) Scarce resources;
(7) Institutionalization of instruments;
(8) Planning levels;
(9) Indicators;
(10) Social planners.

Each group concerned itself with a specific aspect of social planning and discussed the day's work with special relevance to one of the aspects listed.

As one might expect from an I.D.S. Conference, members were not concerned with the nuts and bolts of social planning! The discussion focused on the concept of planning, planning as a function and some esoteric embroidering on first principles. There was a great deal of enthusiasm throughout and the momentum was maintained until the end. It was common to see the "small groups" working at their individual reports up to 9.30 p.m.

Professor Apthorpe is now engaged in writing the final Report of the Conference which will be first published in the "Journal of Development Studies" in April 1970, and subsequently will be published by Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. as a paperback. It is hoped that the final Report will make a considerable contribution to the literature on social planning and reveal some original thinking in this cliché-ridden sector of development studies.

NEW ZEALAND – *Institute of Town Clerks and Municipal Treasurers, Christchurch* 1969. *Minimum qualifying standards suggested.*

The President, Mr. Tait, had practical suggestions on the form these minimum qualifications should take. He said: "It appears that university degrees are becoming more concentrated and difficult and it is necessary to attend university as a full-time student to gain them. This being the case, the choice of a minimum qualification for town clerks lies with (1) the Certificate of Proficiency in Local Authority Administration, (2) the New Zealand Certificate in Commerce, or (3) membership of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries, or, of course, a degree in accountancy or commerce. The fifth-year course of the New Zealand Certificate in Commerce deals with local authority administration, and this may well provide you with a minimum qualification. If your institute considers that the course does not go far enough, then you should make representations to have it enlarged, and I am sure that representations from this institute would be carefully considered.

"It may be argued that it is not necessary for the smaller municipalities to have town clerks qualified by some examination. While the qualifications need not be so high initially, promotions should come from within the institute and I suggest that if you considered a period of five years should elapse after which time no further appointments would be made without qualifications, young men would have time to attain the standards required."

From *New Zealand Local Government*, May 1969.

Book Reviews

Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 1966-69; *H.M. Stationery Office, London,* 1969; Vol. I (The Report; together with maps) £2 0s. 0d. Vol. II (Memorandum of Dissent, by D. Senior) £1 7s. 6d. (including Maps). Vol. III (Research Appendices, together with maps) £1 17s. 6d.

Since the end of the second World War there has been a succession of Commissions and committees investigating the problems of English Local Government – the Local Government Boundary Commission, 1945–48, the Local Government Commission for England, 1958–65, the Maud Committee on Management in Local Government, the Mallaby Committee on Staffing, the Herbert Commission on Greater London, and many others. But still the feeling grew that all these were only patching and mending a system that had become out of date and inadequate. One by one important services were being taken away from local authorities and vested in nominated boards or regional councils, and public trust in the system was waning. Citizens were questioning a pattern of democracy that involved full freedom to choose the local rulers, but not much opportunity for the man in the street to play any real part in shaping his own environment – in planning the future development of the town or village he lives in, or the nature of the school to which his children go.

In 1965 the Minister, Richard Crossman, announced his intention to appoint a commission to review the whole structure of local government from top to bottom; a few months later the Maud Commission started its task of collecting evidence and finding a solution to the problems.

In June this year the Report was published. It proposes the complete reorganization of local government in the country. The Commission came to the conclusion that it was essential that all the statutory services of local authorities should be entrusted to single unitary authorities of adequate size. The old division of the social services, health services, housing, etc., between an upper and a lower tier of councils had proved confusing and inefficient. Now the whole range – planning, housing, education, social services, police, health, welfare and all – should be transferred to new "unitary" authorities, ranging in size from a population of 200,000 to a million. The old division of government into town and country authorities should go, the urban and rural areas being treated as component and complementary parts of the new unitary areas. Only in three great urban areas (outside Greater London) would there be a different pattern – in Greater Manchester, Greater Birmingham and Greater Liverpool. There, the system would be like that of London – a Metropolitan Council for the major services, supported by a number of second tier boroughs.

While it is clear that these new unitary authorities would be efficient and co-ordinated, it is also clear that they would be remote and out of touch with the wishes of the people. So, it is proposed, there should be in every town

and village, a "Local Council", which would have a primary duty of representing the opinions of the local people, and a secondary function of providing any service, outside the statutory functions of the unitary authorities, that the people want. These would in fact be modelled on the pattern of the existing parish councils, which have shown themselves, in the last few years, to be a very important part of local democracy. Above the 58 unitary authorities and 3 metropolitan councils would be 8 regional councils to co-ordinate planning and to settle the broad economic land use and investment framework, replacing the existing regional economic planning councils.

Broadly the case for this drastic reform is that if something of this sort is not done, all the important functions of local government will be taken, one by one, into the hands of central ministries or regional boards. Already hospitals, gas, electricity and some technical colleges, have gone. Water, police, transportation and other services are in process of moving out of local government control; fire services, ambulances, health services, and housing are threatened; education and children's services are at risk.

The case against the proposals is that it would take control away from local people and vest it in the hands of distant authorities, which would be remote and bureaucratic. The Local Councils, it is argued, would never come to life in the towns.

So far most of the criticism has come from Aldermen, Councillors, Mayors, Town Clerks, and others whose positions, powers and importance are threatened. Understandably, they are resentful and hostile. But it looks as if the Government is determined to press ahead with reform of local government, based on the Report, with or without modifications.

B. KEITH LUCAS

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: AN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH APPROACH TO THE PROCESSES OF PUBLIC PLANNING, by J. K. FRIEND and W. N. JESSOP; *London Tavistock Publishers*, 1969; index; pp. xxiv, 296; 78s.

This is a highly sophisticated research study carried out for the Institute for Operational Research (an offshoot of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations) by J. K. Friend and W. N. Jessop.

The authors and their staff were able over a period of four years to study the working of Coventry City Council, its structure, its organization and its machinery for decision making, in order to draw conclusions about methods and organization of local authorities in the vital "strategic levels of choice which impinge on the future physical and social development of local communities".

The Coventry City Council, both elected members and officials gave them all possible assistance and the authors brought to their task an impressive knowledge and experience of Operational Research (O.R.) but apparently no previous experience of local government. The book shows however that these four years were not wasted.

This is a scientific work requiring close study and, although spattered with maps, plans, charts, diagrams and models, manages to illuminate one of the basic dilemmas of local government, viz: how to ensure that vital problems are isolated from those of lesser importance, are presented to top management in

such a way that all reasonable options are offered for choice and that top management, both elected members and officials, are free to devote their time to these vital problems.

Written before the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England (The Redcliffe-Maud Report) it is extremely topical and should be of assistance to all those in Whitehall and in the local government field who wish to make an intelligent contribution to the great debate on the future of local government in the U.K. about to begin. But it is important too for all top administrators in local governments and indeed central governments overseas.

"The Planners" has now become a term of abuse, applied by the Press to any collection of experts proposing a policy which is unpopular with any large group in any community. It is good to see that Friend and Jessop distinguish between "planners" and "policy makers" but sad that they find it so difficult to separate the "land use planners" from those who practise in a wider and multi-disciplinary field.

The chapter on "Information and Uncertainty in Planning" is a model of its kind and taking as one example the problems of Shopping in a City Centre, brilliantly illustrates the danger of making final proposals defective through lack of information or from a compounding of different kinds of uncertainty until the final estimates "can be put forward with considerably less confidence than can any of the intermediate blocks of information in themselves".

Basically this is a study of management in local government; "how local authorities can adapt their internal organization to meet the challenges of strategic choice". The authors do not appear to have asked themselves whether the democratically-elected representatives (Coventry apart) are sufficiently intelligent and have enough management experience to fit them to make the strategic choices required of them under these proposals.

When I was a Local Authority treasurer my newly appointed Chairman of Finance Committee told me, "It's your job to report to me and I will report to the Finance Committee". "No," I somewhat tactlessly replied, "it is my duty to report to the Finance Committee and yours is to preside at the meeting of the committee". These two extremes illustrate the problem of control of local government and the ability of elected representatives, chosen often for their capacity for protest, to make the right strategic decisions. The authors have certainly shown the way to isolate the big issues, to turn the spotlight on the alternatives open to the elected representatives and the organization required to achieve this. This is splendid and now let us determine how to find the best decision makers by a democratic process.

R. S. McDOUGALL

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN AID. Ed. RONALD ROBINSON, *Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee*, pp. 237; 35s.

This volume presents the argument and conference papers of a particularly interesting, useful, and happy conference in the series organized at Cambridge by the Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee. Although this conference was held in 1966, the issues debated in the papers and the argument as presented by Dr. Ronald Robinson are still, with a very few exceptions,

apposite and fresh today. This is perhaps a reflection on how stagnant the whole field of international aid has been in recent years. The fifteen conference papers are reprinted in full; they comprise about three-quarters of the volume. They are written by a galaxy of experts in the international aid field and reflect a good deal of administrative experience as well as economic expertise. The report on the results of the conference comprises the first quarter of the book; it is most stimulating. The whole volume can be recommended to anyone interested in problems of overseas aid and its administration. Quite recently the Duncan Report[1] recommended a one-month basic training course for aid administrators. Dr. Robinson's book should be required reading for this and other courses for aid administrators.

The fifteen conference papers are not printed in any particular order but they may perhaps be summarized under the six headings of Dr. Ronald Robinson's own presentation:—

I *The Case for Economic Aid:* papers by Chief Adebo of Nigeria ("Why Aid?"); Carlos Quintana of Mexico, now with the U.N. ("International Co-operation as a means of developing emerging countries").

II *The Cost and Allocation of Aid* with papers by Professor Chenery ("The Effectiveness of Foreign Assistance"); Dr. I. G. Patel of the Indian Ministry of Finance ("How to Give Aid – a Recipient's Point of View"); Tun Abdul Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia ("Development Implementation in Malaysia").

III *Roles of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid,* Dr. J. Adler of the IBRD ("Multilateral Aid"); Monsieur Audibert of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Bilateral Aid"); Lord Balogh ("Bilateral Aid").

IV *Untying Aid and the External Payments Problem.*

V *The Machinery for International Economic Co-operation,* papers by J. H. Mensah of the UN, presently Finance Minister of Ghana ("International Co-operation"); S. S. Khera of India ("Co-ordination of Aid at the National Level – from the Recipient's point of view"); David Owen of the U.N. ("Co-ordination of International Assistance among the International Agencies"); Professor Thorp of OECD ("Efforts at Co-ordination"); John White of the ODI ("Pakistan and Turkey Consortia").

VI *Aid and the Public,* Rashid Ibrahim of Pakistan ("The Psychology of Foreign Aid"); Professor Wiseman ("The Impact of Aid for Development on the Public at all Levels").

A few minor critical comments may be made. Throughout Dr. Robinson's summary there runs the assumption that multilateral aid is unpopular among the donors' public and parliaments and that therefore a shift to multilateralism, desirable as it is, may be too dearly bought by a reduction in the total flow of aid. I am rather doubtful about this proposition. Not only are there countries such as Holland and Sweden where multilateral aid is distinctly more popular than bilateral, but more recently there seems to be a more general trend in this direction among all the aid donors. This comment however is perhaps less a criticism than an indication of recent changes since

[1] *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation* 1968–69, Chairman Sir Val Duncan.

the conference was held. It may be added that the shift of sentiment towards multilateralism is not necessarily due to very high or lofty motives.

In the light of recent developments the volume also seems to be perhaps a little too optimistic about the aid relationship in Latin America, particularly the trend towards regional co-operation there. Also it is unfortunately not the case as is stated by Dr. Robinson in his introduction on page 2 that the UN Development Programme representative acts as Manager of the Consortia and Consultative Groups in respect of technical assistance. One could only wish that it were true, but alas it is not!

It would be wrong, however, for this review to end on a critical note. It must be emphasized that the volume will be most useful. It is a vindication of the conference, and the summary by Dr. Robinson is a splendid distillation of its essence and flavour.

H. W. SINGER

THE COMMON MARKET AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA, *by* PHILIP NDEGWA. *East African Publishing House, second edition,* 1968. 228 pp. 20s.

The issue of economic co-operation and co-ordination among different African countries is of major importance in Africa, and the experiences of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in this are of interest far beyond the East African region itself. It is, therefore, particularly fortunate that Mr. Philip Ndegwa, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning in Kenya, has brought out a new and revised edition of his study on the East African Common Market, which was first published in 1965. Mr. Ndegwa is naturally writing in a personal capacity, but there is no doubt that his position as the Civil Service Head of a most effective ministry in Kenya brings to his analysis a depth and an authority that is hard to match elsewhere. This, the second edition of his book, brings the statistical information more up to date and contains three entirely new chapters dealing with the Kampala Agreement, the Treaty for East African Co-operation, and a concluding section on the possibilities of wider economic co-operation in Eastern Africa as a whole.

The book begins with a general discussion on trade and development of under-developed countries in a world setting. This is an admirably clear exposition, although the emphasis on the importance of import substitution is not wholly convincing. There then follow useful chapters of a "handbook" nature, which painstakingly take the reader through all the intricacies of the trading accounts. This is not a dry as dust technical analysis, but a lively description that leaves the reader with a clear understanding of the features of East African trade, both within the region itself and with other neighbouring countries.

When dealing with policy matters Mr. Ndegwa is forthright and honest, and he is right to stress that what Uganda and Tanzania have wanted from an East African Common Market is not financial compensation as recommended by the Raisman Commission, "but a share in the industrialization process facilitated by the existence of the common market" (p. 136).

There is a short but frank discussion of the failure of the Kampala Agreement, and this takes Mr. Ndegwa up to the present Treaty for East African

Co-operation and the formal establishment of an East African Community, of which the Common Market is a part. Here it is of course too early to form any judgement on its impact. Mr. Ndegwa refers to the possible loss of administrative economies through decentralization following the re-organization of the East African Common Services Organization. At this point a more thorough analysis of the administrative problems of setting up complex supra-national structures, and particularly the Common Market headquarters at Arusha, would have been revealing. The author has worries about the transfer tax, "which is a euphemistic term for a selective tariff, [and which] makes the reorganized Common Market not a common market as generally understood" (p. 193). Also, there are no provisions for a free movement of capital and labour.

Mr. Ndegwa is right to see the Treaty not as the end of the road but as the beginning. He looks to wider economic co-operation with an enlarged Community and he sees the East African association with the European Economic Community as making it easier ultimately to embrace Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda. Here he stresses the importance of speed, as "the longer these countries wait the stronger will become vested interests against establishment of a full customs union" (p. 211).

Perhaps, however, one of the main lessons to be learnt from the East African experience in economic co-operation is that without political thrust, closer union has little chance of getting under way; and that in any event it does not come overnight. Already a generation has slipped by since the establishment of the East African High Commission during colonial days in 1948, through its re-incarnation as the East African Common Services Organization, and now on to the East African Community. Yet still one is only on the threshold.

TOM SOPER

IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PLANNING – ASPECTS OF PAKISTAN EXPERIENCE, by I. D. CARRUTHERS; *Department of Economics, Wye College,* 1968; pp. vi + 67; 10s.

This treatise, as its name suggests, attempts to combine a review of some of the problems of planning irrigation development with an introduction to irrigation in Pakistan. That no claim is made to have treated either theme comprehensively does not entirely eliminate a sense of incompleteness that the reader feels; a sense enhanced by the readability which the writer has managed to achieve on a highly complex subject. When we reach the end we wish there had been more.

The text is divided into seven chapters in which the two themes are thoroughly mixed up, beginning with the characteristics of irrigated agriculture, followed by an outline of Pakistan's water development policy and planning procedures, design criteria for various kinds of investment, developments in the Lower Indus, factors in project appraisal, and agricultural taxation and water pricing. The chapters themselves are sometimes rather episodic in that they are built up of interesting topics loosely linked together (Chapter 4 on Project Design Criteria is an example).

The text is a timely contribution to the discussion of irrigation development and will be good (and intelligible) reading for many who are not expert

economists. It is salutary first to be reminded on page 1 that "to the farmer water is simply one input in the production process"; it is shown (p. 35 *et seq*) that farmers in Pakistan tend to use the water available to them not in ways considered to be technically optimal but in ways which, in combination with their other resources (notably land and labour) are likely to give them the best returns to water in the short and medium term. That their practices have adverse long-term effects on soil fertility is hardly their fault; since most of them are share-croppers with insecure tenure, they have little incentive to think in the long term.

Irrigated agriculture in the Indus Plains is a huge and highly complex undertaking with a vast potential for further development in terms not only of further land and water but also by way of improved productivity. Carruthers suggests for instance that the twenty three million acres currently irrigated and cropped once a year could be raised to sixty six million cropped acres merely by intensification of water use (of which there is a plentiful river supply). The problem is complicated however by the capital investment this implies, the need for drainage and, indeed, groundwater supplies (not to mention improvements in farmer education, credit, etc.) Because there is a wide variety of ways of providing water and a host of technical and economic considerations, both long and short term, governing its utilization in any one part of the basin, it is necessary to co-ordinate development on a Provincial basis through the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority.

Carruthers concentrates attention on the Lower Indus regional plan which is part of the whole, and deals with some of the specific issues of choice which arise in this area. Output targets appear to have been given priority as criteria for decision over such considerations as return on capital, regional income equality or political and administrative convenience. With a long history of irrigation in the area, settlement problems are proportionately of minor importance. Nevertheless the author gives the impression that rather little attention in research and planning has so far been given to social and institutional structures and the planning of possible changes in them. Thus for instance, while reference is made to the opportunity cost of labour and a rough estimate made of its shadow price there is no reference to the effective supply of labour. Later a rather moderate rate of uptake of irrigation water by farmers is noted: while a number of factors are likely to be operative here, the established seasonal pattern of work and the social institutions associated (which determine the effective supply of farmers' and workers' labour over the seasons) is likely to be one crucial factor, and one that with ingenuity might be investigated.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 give a good (though by no means exhaustive) impression of some of the practical problems encountered in comparing alternative investment choices, especially in the conditions of the Lower Indus. Among other things the timing of investment and returns is shown to be of crucial significance in the choice of projects; the difficulties which face the appraiser where these vary widely is emphasized. Carruthers observes "it would appear that the theoretical rigour and expertise devoted to derivation of 'correct' procedures is out of balance with the equally critical aspect of data collection, processing and forecasting. However, rigorous analysis with poor data is better than poor analysis with poor data". This is certainly a

wise view; the worse mistakes can still be avoided. The real moral however is that data collection must be improved and the process of planning and forecasting, evaluation of achievement and plan-revision needs to be intimately associated (through mixed survey teams, pilot units, etc.) with the development process. The sums spent on research in rural development are minute compared with those for modern industrial enterprises of similar scale in investment terms.

In the final chapter there is an interesting treatment of water pricing. It is a major difficulty, particularly in Muslim countries, to establish a system of payment for water by which, on the one hand, realistic water charges ensure economy in water use and, on the other, those who benefit most from investment contribute most to its cost. The gap between public and private charges demanded and paid for water is often very wide. Carruthers reviews the arguments for and against direct water charges. Though the considerations are complex, including the administrative costs of collection, he rightly concludes that because the direct beneficiaries are, in most cases, identifiable they should bear some charge. (In West Pakistan the political strength of the landowners who benefit either directly or indirectly may be one reason for lower water rates.)

The suggestion is made that betterment levies and annual charges to cover *additional* investment and recurrent costs in irrigation water should be charged wherever water supplementary to existing supplies is added. It is forecast that this would tend to bring about economic use of this water and, if rights to water were transferable, lead eventually to a market for supplementary water which would further increase its effective application. It is obviously of crucial importance to consider how the three major classes - landlords, share tenants and emerging capitalist farmers – would react and be affected by such a plan.

D. S. THORNTON*

NEW HOPE FOR RURAL AFRICA - Ed. E. R. WATTS; *East Africa Publishing House, Nairobi* (1969) *for The Department of Rural Economy & Extension, Makerere University College*; pp. 151; (EA) Shs. 12/50.

Although the Conference which led to the publication of this Report was held in 1967 it was not until 1969 that the Report itself was made available in its present form. If this was a conscious act of policy, which is doubtful, the publication could not have been better timed as its general publication coincides with a growing international interest in rural development as a prime necessity for developing countries.

For the most part the major contributors to the Report are people who are very well known for their work in rural Africa and who deservedly have a reputation for getting "mud on their boots". As one would expect, the end result of their deliberations is an essentially practical Report, refreshingly free from the jargon of sociology, which points with great clarity to the successes and failures of the voluntary organization in pilot projects for rural development.

* Dr. Thornton's review was first written for the Journal of the Cotton Research Corporation and is published here with the kind permission of the Editor.

To the uninitiated the list of projects operated by voluntary agencies will come as a very pleasant surprise, both in numbers and in range of activities. No less than nine projects are listed under Rural Extension, eleven projects under Agricultural Education, five projects under Settlement, and twelve projects under the heading of General.

The experience garnered from these projects covers most of the African continent. Work in the Provinces of Nigeria is contrasted and seen with projects in such widely different areas as North West Uganda and the Rift Valley.

In the Report the theme of new hope for rural Africa is developed with a chapter on "The Way Ahead" which vigorously puts forward the contribution that can be made by voluntary organizations as partners in the development plan for rural areas, and rightly stresses the problem of co-ordination within the range of activities undertaken by the voluntary organizations and the essential co-ordination with Government planning.

The following chapter on "The School Leaver Problem" contains much wisdom and the general proposition on the failure of farm schools and farm institutes is drawn from a wealth of experience. If one criticism could be levelled at the Conference it is that this massive problem of the unemployed school leaver, with its huge social implication in present day Africa, possibly deserved more attention than it seemingly received from the Report.

The remainder of the Report deals in some detail and in a critical manner with the types of projects undertaken by the Churches in East Africa. There is no attempt to gloss over the many difficulties encountered and there is a commendable modesty concerning obvious successful initiatives.

For the Government Administrator who is concerned with rural development, for planners and for all those who have the true interest of Africa at heart, this Report is an essential volume for the bookshelf. It contains so much of value in terms of experience, and is so eminently quotable that there is a temptation for a reviewer to include long excerpts from the Report in the review itself. Self-discipline imposes one quote only – "Rural development is not just the building up of one skill nor of one aspect of the character of an individual. It is fitting men, women and children to take their places as responsible, dignified and productive members of the agricultural community". To this Christians and non-Christians alike will say "Amen".

A. R. G. PROSSER

CAPITALISM, PRIMITIVE AND MODERN.
SOME ASPECTS OF TOLAI ECONOMIC GROWTH by T. SCARLETT EPSTEIN; *Manchester University Press*, 1968, pp. 182; 45s.

This is an interesting book by a well-known writer in the field of economic anthropology. The Tolai are a Melanesian people living on the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, to the north-east of the mainland of New Guinea. They are regarded as one of the most sophisticated and advanced people of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Already ten years ago their per capita cash receipts, subsistence production excluded, amounted to £A25, a figure that bore comparison with those for some quite well-off peoples in other tropical areas.

Dr. Epstein's starting point is that the Tolai economic system before colonial days could be characterized as one of "primitive capitalism" (a side-swipe at the idea of "primitive communism"). The environment was favourable, and soils fertile, and the Tolai had developed a trade network based on shell money (*tambu*). The currency was easily divisible, and was also capable of being a store of value for quite large amounts. Some of the older theories which regarded such systems as "non-monetary" now seem less relevant than they did. Authors formerly had a classical view of money as a totally liquid commodity, which now appears idealized. As Douglas has argued, the world monetary picture with its limited circles of exchange rather resembles monetary systems of the type formerly called "primitive". Pre-conquest Tolai was preoccupied with the accumulation of wealth measured in shell money. Land, the only major asset required for productive activity, was readily available to all. Monetary accumulations bought prestige and political influence, and "entrepreneurial" skills were developed to that end.

The next phase of Tolai economic development came with contact with Europeans. For about twenty five years, Tolai concentrated on the sale of produce, rather than of labour. Dr. Epstein calls this a "transitional period", in which they still cared more for the accumulation of shell money than they did for traders' goods. It seems difficult to generalize this Tolai feature: in disagreement with the author, it does not seem demonstrable that "if given the choice" an indigenous people will always initially choose to sell produce rather than labour. In West Africa at least a not unconvincing case could be made for the opposite view.

In the next Tolai phase ("Agricultural Investment") the people began to expand coconut cultivation for the copra industry. Foreign goods joined shell money as signs of status. In the next phase ("Investment Trial Period"), which was interrupted by the last war, the ownership of copra driers was tried and gave way to investment in lorries. In the present "Tertiary Investment Period", post-war development grants have helped the full growth of Tolai investment in the tertiary sector: transport and retail services.

Dr. Epstein attempts a little heroically to generalize this scheme *in toto*. No doubt some such sequence of periods has its echoes in other parts of the world. No doubt also certain kinds of political and social changes are associated with some of them. The fact that the Tolai are still a colonial people is at least one important factor which restricts the general application of their case. The time-scale of the Tolai phases (and their relative lengths) does not fit the many other cases where initial contact is no older, and yet where ten years of independence with its less "welfare"-minded political and economic conditions has also occurred. The importance of this competently documented book lies in the useful insights the author gives into the detailed workings of certain of the Tolai phases. She draws attention to the "primitive affluence" which comes with the first contact with cash-cropping, and which may lead a population to react sharply should the boom conditions not continue. Dr. Epstein's final advice to the local administrations to take heed will no doubt be taken seriously.

EDWIN ARDENER

Other Books Reviewed

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, by M. A. FAZAL; *Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press,* 1969; tables, bibliography & index; pp. 344; 80s.

Dr. Fazal is to be congratulated on setting out lucidly and within some 350 pages, the present practice and the historical-legal background to administrative law in India and Pakistan. He considers that both countries could well adopt much of the American Administrative Procedures Act. He explains the anomalies in private-law remedies and indicates the need to dispense with the two months' notice rule which creates injustice for citizens wishing to bring suits against the State or public officers and debars them from obtaining injunctions during this period. The doctrine of Sovereign Immunity for acts done in the exercise of statutory powers dates from a judgement of 1861 which Dr. Fazal considers to require urgent reform on the lines of the British Crown Proceedings Act. He strongly supports the Indian Law Commissioner's recommendation that the applicability of the *audi alteram partem* rule should be provided for more definitely by a general statute.

A GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA, Ed. R. MANSFIELD PROTHERO; *Routledge & Keegan Paul;* bibliographies, maps, index; pp. 480; £3 10s.

Eight notable geographers contribute regionally-oriented essays to this excellent up-to-date geography of Africa. The first map very sensibly shows the year in which each country achieved independence. The Editor in his admirable introductory chapter emphasizes how human geography is concerned most of all "with relationships between people and the physical environment within which they operate", and how all too often development planners pay too little attention to understanding the physical environment of the peoples for whom they are planning.

Dependence on seasonally available water supplies from distant sources places severe restraints on human activities in much of Africa, and as Prothero concludes "there is no quick and easy road to the better life" – the "often harsh but quite fundamental realities" of African geography, enhanced by an increasing population, is now, he believes, being faced up to in most African countries, and he calls for a sympathetic understanding and appreciation from those involved in Africa's problems, be they politicians, academics, business men or technicians.

This book is very much more than a "geography" – it is a study of man and his environment in Africa, a book which should be read by all those, general readers as well as specialists, who are concerned or interested in the development of the African continent.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN ONTARIO, by F. F. SCHINDELER; *University of Toronto Press;* appendices & index; pp. 295; $8.50.

Professor Schindeler's study of provincial government in Ontario shows how short parliamentary sessions and long periods with the same party in power combined to produce a system in which the executive – the Premier and his Cabinet – dominated the legislature and the civil service tended to equate the government with the majority party, all this as "the natural outgrowth of the long association of one party with the administration". An effective executive, an ineffective legislature, allied to continuity in office, must certainly have simplified the decision-making process and facilitated the conduct of Provincial Government business which expanded enormously after the end of World War II. Appendix "D" lists the great number of advisory bodies, departmental, ministerial, quasi-judicial and other semi-government agencies, many of them post-war creations and all under a greater or lesser degree subject to executive influence.

A number of the reforms recommended by Professor Schindeler – mainly to make the legislature more effective vis à vis the Executive have now been implemented.

NIGERIAN FEDERAL FINANCE, by ADEBAYO ADEDEJI; *Hutchinson Educational;* appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 308; 70s.

Dr. Adedeji has produced a most valuable book on federal finance in Nigeria. While he has concentrated on the twenty-year period ending in 1966, he has also taken into account the sad events of the following two years.

He reaches five main conclusions in respect of fiscal adjustment in a federation: federal grants to States must aim at the avoidance of inefficiency, waste of public money and national allocation of resources; criteria for adjustment need to be flexible; federal grants vice State revenues should be minimized; any conditional grants must be kept to the minimum so as to ensure maximum effort by States to resolve their own problems; permanent and independent machinery is needed to achieve an effective adjustment process – the Australian Grants Commission and the Finance Commission of India are cited as suitable examples. An interesting table showing the author's proposed allocation of tax jurisdiction and revenue is provided.

HISTORY OF KENYA'S TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, by MAKHAN SINGH; *East African Publishing House;* illustrations, index; pp. 332; Sh. 21 (EA).

The author played a leading part in the early days of the Trade Union Movement in Kenya. He has now set out the story from the first railway workers' strike in 1900 to the establishment of the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions in June 1952 shortly before the outbreak of the "Mau Mau" emergency.

Makhan Singh recounts the difficulties faced by James Patrick, the first Trade Union Labour Officer employed by the Kenya Government – in particular the opposition of employers to the 1949 Wages and General Conditions of Employment Bill, as shown at a public meeting of settlers held at Thika, when there were those who still thought seriously that they could halt the development of Trade Unions altogether. If the author often deplores British Government policy – he makes it clear that it was Colonial Office policy that furthered the progress of Trade Unions notwithstanding strong local opposition from the European employer community.

GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN, by G. T. POPHAM; *Pergamon Press,* 1969; appendix & index; pp. 268; (flexi-cover) 25s.

Dr. Popham has produced a very readable text book on how the machinery of Government in Britain operates; intended for Local Government Examination Board students, there is plenty of useful knowledge in this volume for a wide range of general readers. *Inter alia* the functioning of Question Time in the House of Commons, the accountability process, the structure of the civil service (with a postcript on the Fulton Report) are lucidly explained, all enhanced by the author's admirable political impartiality.

HOW TO FIND OUT ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENT, by WILFRID H. SNAPE; *Pergamon Press,* 1969; with index; pp. 173; 21s.

This excellent and well produced handbook contains a remarkable quantity of useful information, all clearly set out under appropriate headings. These include Public Relations & Information Bureaux, Societies and Institutions, Education & Training, Research, Comparative Local Government, books/documents/periodicals, audio-visual sources of information, and Scotland. Wilfrid Snape's purpose of telling his readers "how to find out" is admirably achieved. Local authority councillors and staff members and all those who are interested in local government in Britain will find this a valuable addition to their bookshelves.

COLONIAL CADET IN NIGERIA, by J. H. SMITH; *Duke University Press, Dec.* 1968; with appendix and index; pp. 202; $7.50.

It is a pity that John Smith felt he had to write this book, for it is a disappointment and does not do him justice. The work of a young administrative cadet in those provinces of N. Nigeria in which he served between 1951 and 1956 really was not very exciting or significant. Others who have written of other periods in Nigeria – Haig, Hastings, Crocker, Johnston, and notably Heussler – all had a better tale to tell.

But if next time John Smith will really tell us about the post-1966 Nigeria we shall forgive him. No one knows more than he does of the events of that year that brought a world to an end; and of what has happened since. That book, which he really must write, would be John Smith's contribution to recorded history.

THE BRITISH IMAGE OF INDIA, by ALLEN J. GREENBERGER; *Oxford University Press,* 1969; biog. notes, bibliography, index; pp. 234; 45s.

Allen Greenberger writes with erudition and felicity on Imperial attitudes to subject India as disclosed by the wide choice of British authors upon whom he draws, with sympathy and insight to both sides, to illustrate his sociological study. The latter include Kipling and Forster, Orwell and Philip Mason, John Masters and Nevil Shute – not all of the authors would be happy with a sub-title suggesting that theirs were imperialist products.

THE ECONOMICS OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES, by EDITH H. WHETHAM & JEAN I. CURRIE; *Cambridge University Press,* 1969; glossary & index; pp. 288; 60s. (Paperback 18s.).

This should prove a very useful textbook for economics students. Apart from a few industrial complexes in Central, South and West Africa, the economy of the continent as a whole depends overwhelmingly on its agricultural output and the value of this book is enhanced by the authors' own expertise in agricultural economics based on experience in Northern Nigeria.

UGANDA – THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION, by H. F. MORRIS and JAMES S. READ, *Stevens & Stevens, London;* map, bibliography, tables, index; pp. 448; paperback £1 15s.

The original 1966 edition of Morris and Read's Uganda laws and constitution has now been reissued as a paperback. An admirably and perceptively written Part I provides the historical background leading to the Constitution at independence and to an outline of the laws. While this must still be a very useful textbook – one of interest, too, for the general reader, its lasting value requires a new edition revised so as to include *inter alia* the reform of the constitution and the major changes in the courts and district government systems which have taken place since 1965.

SMALLHOLDER FARMING AND SMALLHOLDER DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA, Ed. HANS RUTHENBERG; *Weltforum Verlag, Munich;* pp. 360.

This volume contains ten case studies in a variety of small-holding farm areas of Tanzania. Space allows for mention of four: Newiger's fair assessment of the expensive, well-intended, now largely abandoned "villagization scheme"; Walter Scheftler's very competent examination of the Western Region's flue-cured tobacco schemes (doubtless the records available did not show how the early successes at Tumbi were due to the exceptional ability of Trevor Tice of E.A.T.Co., and how personalities counted, too, in developing Urambo); Ruthenberg's brief note on Chagga Coffee/banana growing – too cursory to have merited inclusion; Attem's on farming in the Usambaras. There is a long history to the invariably unsuccessful efforts of those who tried over the years to improve the farming methods of the Wasambaa (particularly in the Mlalo basin area) which the author here did not perhaps have the opportunity to learn.

It would have added to the value of the studies had rather more clear conclusions been drawn: e.g. how co-operatives fail in dealing with plantation crops, how plantation crops, generally, prove unsuitable for smallholders; how, if the incentive carrot is sufficiently attractive, *soi-disant* idle cultivators are often soon found to be industrious and highly productive.

TANGANYIKA UNDER GERMAN RULE, 1905–1912, by JOHN ILIFFE; *Cambridge University Press,* bibliography & index; pp. 236; 35s.

The author has produced a scholarly, very readable and most interesting history of a short period in the pre-World-War-One era in Tanganyika. The political background in Germany is shrewdly related to events and policy making in East Africa; the reader is provided with a mine of valuable and often little known information. Mr. Iliffe combines historical fact with some stimulating, if controversial, argument which tempts him to reach beyond the years which are the particular object of his study. Here, for example, he equates the role of Marealle with that subsequently held by Abdiel Shangali, but the latter's position was at first solely that of Chief of Machame and only with the 1946 reforms did he become divisional Chief of Hai – until he unsuccessfully contested the 1951 election for the new office of Paramount Chief he never sought nor obtained a position of influence in Vunjo or Rombo. His particular importance was that he was the first well educated, progressive Chagga Chief and his chiefdom was the largest on Kilimanjaro.

There is much of interest about the Maji Maji rebellion (Ngarambi is correctly shown in the map but wrongly described in the text as being on the Rufiji), but the fate of the Wangindo of Liwale is inadequately described; they captured the German boma, and were decimated in the reprisals that followed, abandoning for good, out of fear and lack of numbers, many fine fertile valleys. Indeed they suffered more than most Tanganyika tribes – the Angoni invasion, German vengeance and, finally, compulsory migration to Kilwa district, when the British were furthering the Groundnut Scheme, almost completed their disruption before they were reprieved, just in time, through the intervention of Ted Pike (subsequently Governor of British Somaliland).

TANZANIA BEFORE 1900, Ed. A. ROBERTS; *East African Publishing House, Nairobi;* pp. 162; 35s.

Seven contributors provide individual area studies – two from the North and five from the West and South West of Tanzania. The authors are to be congratulated on providing this pleasantly written and informative background to the better known recent history of the tribal groups described. Of particular interest is the editor's own study of the Nyamwezi, a great power in the Nineteenth Century who straddled the caravan route to the Western Lakes and were famous as traders and travellers. A more detailed future history may show their power as extending further Southward and Westward than is generally believed. It is not easy today to envisage the past might of a people whose whole environment as later known was so adversely affected by the scourge of tsetse fly and the sleeping sickness they conveyed. Alas! the maps are not up to the standard of the text.

PREDICTING SUCCESS IN SCHOOL CERTIFICATE, by H. H. SOMERSET; *East African Publishing House, Nairobi;* pp. 115; Shs. (E.A.) 15.

The author studies the results of a large sample of those who passed the Uganda Junior Secondary Leaving Examination in 1960 and then looks at their results in the Cambridge Certificate exam. of 1964. It seems that the first examiners did not spot the winners as well as might have been done had the papers been better set or had the level of primary education been higher.

Too much should not be made of a study which has been made partially irrelevant by changes already introduced before it was written. Some might well think it surprising had the same pattern of 1960 results been followed in the results of a different exam when the pupils were all four years older. Anyway let us hope that Uganda's education planners do not set too great a store by school rat race results.

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